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805.01

Jury trial of right.

(1) RIGHT PRESERVED. The

right of trial by jury as declared in article I, section 5 of the
constitution or as given by a statute and the right of trial by
the court shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
(2) DEMAND. Any party entitled to a trial by jury or by
the court may demand a trial in the mode to which he is
entitled at or before the pretrial conference. The demand may
be made either in writing or orally on the record.
(3) WAIVER. The failure of a party to demand in accordance with sub. (2) a trial in the mode to which he is entitled
constitutes a waiver by him of trial in such mode. The right
to trial by jury is also waived if the parties or their attorneys
of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an
oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record,
consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury. A demand
for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
* B.A. 1968, Marquette University; M.A. 1969, Ohio State University; candidate

for J.D. degree at Marquette University Law School; member MARQuErT LAW REVIEW.
t Editor's Note: This article is the third in a series which examines the recently
adopted Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure. The LAW REVIEW gratefully acknowledges
the comments and criticism of Ray J. Aiken, Professor of Civil Procedure, Marquette
University Law School, who was a member of the Judicial Council Civil Rules Committee which drafted the new rules. The LAW REviEW also acknowledges the assistance
of Charles D. Clausen, formerly a professor at the Law School, in granting the author
permission to incorporate into the article portions of his Judicial Committee Notes and
his unpublished monograph, "Commentary on Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure."
Traditionally the LAW REVIEW has not accorded lead article statue to student writing. However, due to the nature and scope of this topic, as well as the scholarship
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This rule is adapted from Federal Rule 38 but includes important changes in the language of the federal rule to accommodate the role of trial to the court in state practice.
Subsection (1) replaces section 270.07. In Wisconsin, a litigant's entitlement to trial by jury is not a matter of pleading,
practice or procedure subject to supreme court rule-making
under section 251.18; it is a matter of substantive right under
the state constitution.' Determining when the right exists is
simple in simple contexts, for example, a suit by A against B
seeking only a money judgment, or only the recovery of goods
in specie or land with no counterclaims. In such cases, because
the only relief sought is purely legal, there is, of course, a right
to trial by jury. The problem becomes less simple, however, as
the context changes, for example, where A seeks both legal and
equitable relief,2 or where A's claim is legal (i.e., a suit for
damages) and B interposes an equitable counterclaim, or A's
claim is equitable and B's counterclaim is legal, 3 or where A
seeks declaratory relief.4
The question is further complicated in state practice by the
fact that Wisconsin recognizes a constitutional right to a trial
to the court.5 Hence, although the United States Supreme
Court has evolved a federal policy which strongly protects trial
by jury of all legal issues,' despite the equitable context in
which such issues may arise, Wisconsin has steadfastly adhered to the view that the court sitting without a jury is authorized to grant purely legal relief as long as the equitable action
was commenced in good faith.'
Although former section 270.07 purported to codify the circumstances under which a trial by jury may be had, the language of the statute has required substantial judicial interpretation." Instead of enumerating all of the circumstances in
1. WIs. CONST., art. I, § 5.
2. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
3. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, id.
4. See, e.g., Simley v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
5. Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868).
6. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974), affirming Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (1972), wherein an extensive analysis
of the federal approach to the right to a jury trial can be found.
7. McLennan v. Church, 163 Wis. 411, 158 N.W. 73 (1916).
8. See, e.g., Mortgage Associates v. Monona Shores, 47 Wis. 2d 177, 177 N.W.2d
340 (1970).
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which a constitutional entitlement to a jury trial exists, subsection (1), like Federal Rule 38(a), simply preserves to parties in
litigation their constitutional right as the supreme court may
define them.
Subsection (2) improves the former procedure for requesting a jury trial. By authorizing an on-the-record demand for a
jury trial, this subsection makes mandatory a practice which
was actually routine under the former rules.' Former section
270.115 provided that the notice of trial, served forty days after
the expiration of the time for joinder of issue, must state the
issues which were joined and whether they were triable by a
court or by a jury. If an issue which was in fact triable by a jury
was noticed as triable to the court, a waiver of the right to a
jury trial could occur.10 The danger of such a waiver is eliminated in the new practice by the elimination of the notice of
trial under section 802.10. Federal Rule 38(b) permits only ten
days from the service of the last pleadings to make the demand
for a jury trial, whereas under subsection (2) the election of the
mode of trial is not made until the pretrial conference. At that
point, an intelligent election should be possible.
Subsection (3), based upon Federal Rule 38(d), provides
that the right to a jury trial may be waived either by a failure
to make a demand or by oral or written stipulation as in former
section 270.32.
The new rule eliminates a provision of the former rule
whereby a failure to appear at the trial waives the right to a
jury trial. Instead, section 806.02(5) gives the trial court discretion to render a default judgment against any defendant who
has failed to appear for trial, while section 805.03 gives the
court discretion to dismiss any claimant's cause of action on
the merits for failure to prosecute his claim. Hence, under the
new rules the question of whether a party who has duly requested a jury trial, but who then fails to appear at the trial,
has waived his right to trial by jury is subsumed into the larger
question of when dismissal and default judgment are appropriate sanctions for failure to appear or to prosecute a claim."
9. This was done by moving to remove the case to the jury calendar. See J. CONWAY,
[hereinafter cited as J. CONWAY], § 40.05.
10. Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 Wis. 2d 79, 218 N.W.2d 295 (1974).
11. For a discussion of the constitutional limitation on a court's inherent power to
strike a pleading and grant default judgment, see Hauer v. Christon, 43 Wis. 2d 147,
168 N.W.2d 81 (1969).
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It should be pointed out that the state rules do not contain
the escape provision of Federal Rule 39(b), which gives the
court discretion to order a jury trial on any issue notwithstanding a failure to demand one. Nonetheless, the possibility of
escaping from a waiver despite a failure to make a timely demand may still exist in state practice as well, since the Wisconsin court has previously discouraged attempts to place undue
2
procedural burdens on the constitutional right to a jury trial.
In fact, the new rules contain a procedure for obtaining such
relief. Under section 806.07(1) a trial court has discretion to
relieve a party from a pretrial order authorized by section
802.10(2)(a)5 specifying a trial to the court on the grounds of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
805.02 Advisory jury and trial by consent. (1) In all
actions not triable of right by a jury, the court upon motion
or on its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory

jury.
(2) With the consent of both parties, the court may order
a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial
by jury had been a matter of right.
This section is based upon Federal Rule 39(c). Subsection
(1) will not change state practice, since the ancient equitable
practice of trial with an advisory jury was authorized by former
section 270.07(1). An advisory jury is only an aid to the court
in determining any issue of fact." If the judge is not satisfied
with the findings of the jury, he has discretion to set aside the
verdict and substitute his own findings." Indeed, since the
court is still the trier of fact and since section 805.17 explicitly
requires the court to make express findings regardless of the
advisory verdict, the advisory verdict is relatively immaterial
to the judgment. 5
The jury trial by consent authorized by subsection (2) is an
innovation in state practice. Jury trial by consent of the parties
is not a matter of right. Even though the parties consent to
such a trial, the court may decline to call a jury. But once the
jury has been called, the verdict has the same degree of finality
as when the parties are entitled to a jury trial as of right.
12. Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 Wis.2d at 86, 218 N.W.2d at 299.
13. Dombrowski v. Tomasino, 27 Wis. 2d 378, 385, 134 N.W.2d 420, 424 (1965).
14. See Stahl v. Gotzenberger, 45 Wis. 121 (1878).
15. Dombrowski v. Tomasino, 27 Wis. 2d 378, 134 N.W.2d 420 (1965); Wilson v.
Prasse, 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972).
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805.03 Failure to prosecute or comply with precedure
statutes. For failure of any claimant to prosecute or for failure of any party to comply with the statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any order of court, the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including but not limited to
orders authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a). Any dismissal under
this section operates as af adjudication on the merits unless
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies for good
cause shown recited in the order. A dismissal on the merits
may be set aside by the court on the grounds specified in and
in accordance with s. 806.07. A dismissal not on the merits
may be set aside by the court for good cause shown and
within a reasonable time.

Section 805.03 appropriates the strong sanctions of section
804.12(a), including dismissal of actions or claims, to deter
dilatory and evasive tactics of three kinds: (1) failure to
prosecute, (2) failure to comply with procedural rules, and
(3) failure to comply with any court order. The section is
modeled generally on Federal Rule 41(b)"6 and replaces both
former section 269.25, which authorized the court on notice to
dismiss any action not brought to trial within four years, and
the third sentence of former section 270.54, which permitted a
court to dismiss a complaint with costs where the plaintiff has
unreasonably neglected to serve the summons on all defendants or otherwise to proceed with the action.
Although by its terms this section allows dismissal for noncompliance with even the most trivial procedural rules and
orders, a dismissal with prejudice should be granted only in
16.
R. Civ. P., 41(b) states:
(b) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintift,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
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extreme circumstances. 7 However, some federal cases have
held that circumstances sufficiently extreme to warrant dismissal for want of prosecution exist when a plaintiff fails to
serve the summons within a reasonable time after the filing of
the complaint in violation of Federal Rule 4(a).18 Similarly, if
under state rules a plaintiff fails to serve the defendant within
sixty days after the filing of the complaint in violation of section 801.02(a), and if the defendant has waived this objection
to lack of personal jurisdiction under section 802.06(8), section
805.03 may afford him an alternative avenue of relief. Although
this rule is limited to dismissal on motion by a defendant, it is
not intended to limit in any way the inherent power of the court
to dismiss."9
805.04 Voluntary dismissal: effect thereof. (1) By
PLAINTIFF; BY STIPULATION. An action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court by serving and filing a notice
of dismissal at any time before service by an adverse party
of responsive pleading or motion or by the filing of a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in
the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal
or stipulation, the dismissal is not on the merits, except that
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) BY ORDER OF COURT. Except as provided in sub. (1),
an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
save upon order of court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this subsection is not on the merits.
(3)

COUNTERCLAIM,

CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM.

This section applies to the voluntary dismissal of any counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone shall be made before a responsive pleading is served, or if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(4)

COSTS OF PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED ACTION.

If a plaintiff

17. See Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964);
Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963).
18. Joseph Muller Corp., Zurich v. Societe Anonyme De Gerance Et D'Armement,
508 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally, 2 J.

MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

[hereinafter cited as J. MOORE], 4.06-1.
19. See Latham v. Casey & King Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 311, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964);
Link v. Wabash Ry., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an
action based upon or including the same claim against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of cost of the action previously dismissed as it deems
proper and may stay proceedings in the action until the
plaintiff has complied with the order.
Subsection (1) is generally equivalent to Federal Rule
41(a) (1). It sets out the circumstances under which the plaintiff
may dismiss his action without leave of court."0 Two significant
changes are made in the Wisconsin version of the federal rule.
First, Federal Rule 41(a)(1) states that a notice of dismissal
must be filed before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment whichever occurs first. Some judicial authority
exists for the proposition that notwithstanding the literal sense
of the rule, service of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule 12(b) [Wisconsin statutes section
802.06(2)] also cuts off the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss the action. 21 This problem is resolved in the state version
by language which makes explicit that the right to a voluntary
dismissal terminates whenever the defendant has either filed
a responsive pleading or a motion. Secondly, the federal rule
requires that the plaintiff simply file the notice of dismissal
prior to the service of the answer or motion, but the state version requires both service and filing of the notice. Unlike the
involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiff's evidence under
section 805.14, a dismissal under this section is ordinarily not
a dismissal on the merits unless it is the second voluntary
dismissal on the same claim.
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) are derived from Federal Rule
41(a)(2), (c) and (d) respectively. Except as provided in
subsection (1), subsection (2) does not change prior state practice regarding discontinuances.2 2 Subsection (3) extends the
provisions of this section to all claimants in an action. Where
a plaintiff commences a suit once previously dismissed, subsection (4) gives the court discretion to stay the proceedings pending plaintiff's payment of the costs of the original suit, an alter20. The new rule does not substantially change state practice. See J.

CONWAY,

supra note 9, § 35.01.
21. See Harvey Aluminum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
22. Anderson v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, 119 N.W.342 (1909).
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native designed to discourage suits which are brought and dismissed only to harrass another party.
805.05

Consolidation; separate trials. (1) CoN(a) When actions which might have been brought
as a single action under s. 803.04 are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the claims
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) When actions which might have been brought as a
single action under s. 803.04 are pending before different
courts, any such action may be transferred upon motion of
any party or of the court to another court where the related
action is pending. Transfer under this paragraph shall be
made only by the joint written order of the transferring court
and the court to which the action is transferred.
(2) SEPARATE TRIALS. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be
conducive to expedition or economy, or pursuant to s.
803.04(2)(b), may order a separate trial of any claim, cross
claim, counterclaim or third-party claim, or of any number
of claims, always preserving inviolate the right of trial in the
mode to which the parties are entitled.
SOLIDATION.

This section is based in large part on Federal Rule 42 and
replaces sections 261.04(4), 269.05 and 269.59. Section
895.04(3), making the consolidation of certain wrongful death
actions mandatory, has not been repealed.
Subsection (1) ties the consolidation of separate actions
under this rule to the requirements of the permissive joinder
statute, section 803.04, which provides that claims which may
be joined in one action must arise out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and that similar questions of law or
fact must obtain. At first glance, these requirements appear
considerably stricter than the federal requirements, which permit consolidation as long as the actions have common questions of law or fact. But since the standard for determining the
existence of a transaction or a series of transactions is the liberal test of the existence of a logical relationship between the
claims,

41

there is little practical difference in the results under

23. See 5 J. MOORE, supra note 18, 1 41.16 at 1194.

24. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 803.04, Clausen and Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters801-803, 59 MARQ. L. REV. at 92 (1976).
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either practice.
By its terms, subsection (1)(a) permits the court in appropriate cases either to consolidate the actions into a single action
in which a single judgment is rendered, or to order a joint trial,
where each action retains its separate identity and requires a
separate judgment. The latter procedure is referred to as "consolidation for trial. 2' 5 However, the federal version of this
subsection, which seems similarly to authorize both forms of
consolidation, has been construed to encompass only consolidation for purposes of trial. 6
Wisconsin, however, has long recognized both forms of consolidation of actions. Under former section 269.05, upon consolidation of actions brought in the same court, there remained
but one action and one set of pleadings, whereas under former
section 269.59, actions brought in different courts which were
thereafter consolidated retained their separate existence and
required separate judgments after consolidation.2 Therefore, it
is much more likely that, rather than following federal precedent, the Wisconsin court will hold that subsection (1) (a), which
replaces former section 269.05, authorizes both consolidation
into a single action and consolidation for trial.
Subsection (1)(b) replaces former section 269.57 and sets
the stage for the consolidation of actions which might have
been brought as one action but which are pending in different
state courts. Once one action has been transferred to the court
where a related action is pending under subsection (1)(b),
subsection (1)(a) permits them to be consolidated either into
one action or only for purposes of trial.
Transfer of actions from one court to another is conditioned
upon the "joint written order" of the trial judges of both actions. The joint written order is necessary because it is doubtful
whether the court administrator's statutory authority extends
to the alteration of court calendars without the consent of the
trial judges.2 Consolidation of actions pending before different
25. For a discussion of the different forms of consolidation, see 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE [hereinafter cited as WmGrr & MILLER], §

2382.
26. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933); see generally 9 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 25, § 2382.
27. Wisconsin Brick and Block Corp. v. Vogel, 54 Wis. 2d 321, 195 N.W.2d 664
(1972).
28. Wis. STAT. § 257.19(2) (1973) governing the duties of the court administrator
provides:
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courts will therefore depend upon the willingness of the respective trial judges to cooperate to reduce the total case load of the
state even though the burden of a particular judge will be increased somewhat in the process.
Unlike Federal Rule 42, subsection (2) does not permit separate trials for separate issues (for example, in a negligence
action, separate trials on the issue of liability and the issue of
damages), but rather, separate trials for discrete claims. Specific consolidation provisions are found in section 808.04(4) and
section 895.04(3).
805.06 Referees. (1) A court in which an action is
pending may appoint a referee who shall have such qualifications as the court deems appropriate. The fees to be allowed
to a referee shall be fixed by the court and shall be charged
upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject
matter of the action, which is in the custody and control of
the court, as the court may direct. The referee shall not retain
his report as security for his compensation; but if the party
ordered to pay the fee allowed by the court does not pay it
after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the
referee is entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent party.
(2) A reference shall be the exception and not the rule.
In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a
showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
(3) The order of reference to the referee may specify or
limit his powers and may direct him to report only upon
particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to
receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing
of the referee's report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the referee has and shall exercise
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or
proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the
(2) ADMINSTRATIVE DIRECFOR. The office of adminstrator of courts is created with an administrative director, who shall be the head thereof and who
shall assist the chief justice of the supreme court or other designated justice in
the performance of his duties under s. 251.182, collect such statistics as the
supreme court requires, and perform such other duties as the supreme court
directs.
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order. He may require the production before him of evidence
upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the
production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and may
himself examine them and may call the parties to the action
and examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the
referee shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as a court sitting without a jury.
(4)(a) When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the referee with a copy of the order of reference.
Upon receipt thereof unless the order of reference otherwise
provides, the referee shall forthwith set a time and place for
the first meeting of the parties or their attorneys to be held
within 20 days after the date of the order of reference and
shall notify the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the
referee to proceed with all reasonable diligence. Any party, on
notice to the parties and the referee, may apply to the court
for an order requiring the referee to speed the proceedings and
to make his report. If a party fails to appear at the time and
place appointed, the referee may proceed ex parte or, in his
discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving
notice to the absent party of the adjournment.
(b) The parties may procure the attendance of witnesses
before the referee by the issuance and service of subpoenas.
If without adequate excuse a witness fails to appear to give
evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the consequences, penalties, and remedies provided
in s.s. 885.11 and 885.12.
(c) When matters of accounting are in issue before the
referee, he may prescribe the form in which the accounts shall
be submitted and in any proper case may require or receive
in evidence a statement by a certified public accountant who
is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the form of
statement is insufficient, the referee may require a different
form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific
items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in such
other manner as he directs.
(5)(a) The referee shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference and, if required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file the report with
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the clerk of the court and in an action to be tried without a
jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, shall
file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence
and the original exhibits. The clerk shall forthwith mail to all
parties notice of the filing.
(b) In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall
accept the referee's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of
the report any party may serve written objections thereto
upon the other parties. Application to the court for action
upon the report and upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice. The court after hearing may adopt the
report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part
or may receive further evidence or may recommit it with
instruction.
(c) In an action to be tried by a jury the referee shall not
be directed to report the evidence. His findings upon the
issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the
ruling of the court upon any objections in point of law which
may be made to the report.
(d) The effect of a referee's report is the same whether
or not the parties have consented to the reference; but, when
the parties stipulate that a referee's findings of fact shall be
final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall
thereafter be considered.
Section 805.06, giving the trial court discretion to appoint
a referee, is a substantial adoption of Federal Rule 53 and
makes a number of changes in the former procedure under
sections 270.34 through 270.37. The federal rule refers to "masters," whereas the state rule refers to "referees." The term
"masters" had a pejorative connotation in the middle of the
nineteenth century when Wisconsin became a state. The connotation was due in large part to the reputation of the English
Masters in Chancery for causing unnecessary delay and obfuscation in litigation. Indeed, the feelings against masters ran so
high that Wisconsin's constitution contains an express prohibition of the office of master in chancery.2 9
The constitutionality of references to "referees" rather than
to "masters" is no longer a matter of doubt since the basic
29. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 19 states: "The testimony in causes in equity shall be
taken in like manner as in cases at law, and the office of master in chancery is hereby
prohibited."
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reference provisions of former sections 270.34 through 270.37
have been in the statutes of Wisconsin since the adoption of the
Field Code." Moreover, after law and equity were merged by
adoption of the Field Code in 1856, the constitutional prohibition is no longer as significant as it was prior to 1856.
The functions and powers of a master or referee have long
been affirmed by judicial precedent in both law and equity
practice'.3 Federal Rule 53 and the new rule are predicated
primarily on the former federal equity rules and practice, but
both rules also explicitly provide for the reference of complicated issues in jury cases. Reference to a referee in jury cases
does not violate the constitutional provision guaranteeing trial
by jury."
Under former section 270.34, the facts of a case may be
submitted to a referee upon the written consent of all parties
except in cases of accounts or construction lien foreclosures,
when reference may be on the court's own motion. Section
805.06(1) does away with the requirement of consent. Instead,
the new rule provides that a referee may be appointed in jury
cases only where the issues are complicated and in nonjury
cases, only (1) in matters of account, (2) in matters of difficult
computation of damages,33 or (3) upon a showing of "excep'3
tional circumstances.
Under former section 270.36, the referee could be chosen by
the parties or by the court, if parties failed to agree, and the
number of referees was limited to three. Under the new rule the
use of a referee as well as the choice of who shall be appointed
is at the court's discretion. Although the new rule does not
explicitly authorize more than one referee, the new rule is not
intended to preclude multiple referees.
Subsection (2) delimits the circumstances in which a referee may be appointed. The role of a referee is to help the court
in cases where the expertise of the referee is needed. His ap30. See Norton v. Rooher, 1 Pin. 195, Burnett 33 (1842); Home Ins. Co. v. Security
Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 171 (1868).
31. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
32. Coyner v. United States, 103 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1939); Graffis v. Woodward, 96
F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 631 (1938).
33. See, e.g., Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
34. It is unclear what conditions if any are sufficiently "exceptional" to satisfy this
requirement. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) and commentary
on Wis. STAT. § 805.06(2), infra at 683-84.
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pointment and activities are only for the purpose of assisting
the court to obtain the facts and arrive at a correct result in
complicated litigation.3 5 However, the situations in which a
referee may be appointed have been severely limited by the
United States Supreme Court decision of LaBuy v. Howes
Leather Co.3" In that case, the Court held that neither calendar
congestion, nor unusually complex issues of law and fact, nor
the great length of time necessary if a trial is conducted are
such exceptional circumstances as to warrant depriving the
litigants of their right to a trial by a jury or to the court by
appointing a referee. This view is represented by the statement
in subsection (2) that reference is to be the exception and not
the rule.
Subsections (3) and (4) enumerate the powers of the referee
and describe the procedures he may use in conducting the proceedings. Under former section 270.35, the referee was given
the power to proceed in the same manner as the judge in a trial
by the court. For example, he was given express power to
amend pleadings or to punish for contempt." Under the new
rule as under the federal rule, the powers of the referee are
limited by the order of reference. Although this subsection contains a "necessary and proper clause" in the second sentence
which gives the referee wide discretion in the conduct of the
proceedings pursuant to the order of reference, it is unlikely
35. Webster Eisenbohn, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944).
36. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
37. Wis. STAT. § 270.35 (1973) provided:
270.35 Powers of referee. The trial by referee shall be conducted in the same
manner as a trial by the court. They shall have the same power to grant adjournments and allow amendments to any pleadings as the court upon such trial,
upon the same terms and with the like effect. They shall also have the same
power to preserve order and punish all violations thereof upon such trial, and
to compel the attendance of witnesses before them by attachment and to punish
them as for a contempt for nonattendance or refusal to be sworn or testify, as is
possessed by the court; and they shall give to the parties or their attorneys at
least 8 days' notice of the time and place of trial; they must state the facts found
and concludions of law separately and report their findings, together with all the
evidence taken by them and all exceptions taken on the hearing, to the court;
and the court may review such report and on motion enter judgment thereon or
set aside, alter or modify the same and enter judgment upon the same so altered
or modified, and may require the referees to amend their report when necessary.
The judgment so entered by the court may be appealed from as in other cases,
and the report of the referees shall be incorporated in the appeal record. When
the reference is to report the facts the report shall have the effect of a special
verdict.
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that referee's powers under this rule can be construed to be as
broad as those expressly authorized under the former rule."
Moreover, such a result is desirable since under the new rule
any person may be appointed a referee whereas, under the
former practice
only attorneys and occasionally judges served
39
function.
that
Under former section 270.35, the referee's report may be
accepted, set aside, altered or modified as the court sees fit, but
under subsection (5), the referee's report is more than advisory.
The court may reject the referee's findings of fact in nonjury
cases only when they are clearly erroneous. Although the meaning of the term "clearly erroneous" is, of course, far from univocal, it is clear that the failure of a trial court to follow the
findings of a referee may be reversible error. 0
805.07 Subpoena. (1) ISSUANCE AND SERVICE. Subpoenas shall be issued and served in accordance with ch. 885.
A subpoena may also be issued by any attorney of record in
a civil action or special proceeding to compel attendance of
witnesses for deposition, hearing or trial in the action or special proceeding.
(2) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM. A subpoena may command
the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein.
(3) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. Upon motion made promptly
and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, the court may (a) quash or
modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or
(b) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by
the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or
tangible things designated therein.
(4) FORM. (a) The subpoena shall be in the following
form:
SUBPOENA
STATE OF WISCONSIN
_
COUNTY
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, TO

_

_

805.07 OF THE WISCONSIN STATUTES, You
are hereby commanded to appear in person before

PURSUANT TO SECTION

38. See 5 J. MoORE, supra note 18,

53.06 for a discussion of the limitations on

the referee's powers under FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
39. 5 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 35.18.

40. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

[designating the court, officer, or person and place of
o'clock _.M., to
[date] at
appearance], on plaintiff, and
give evidence in an action between -,
, defendant. [Insert duces tecum clause, if appropriate.] Failure to appear may result in punishment for contempt. Issued this
day of
-,
19-.
[Handwritten Signature]
_

Attorney for [identify party]
(or other official title)
[Address]
[Telephone Number]
(b) For a subpoena duces tecum, the following shall be
inserted in the foregoing form: You are further commanded
to bring with you the following: [describing as accurately as
possible the books, papers, documents or other tangible
things sought].

(5)

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE.

A subpoena may be served in

the manner provided in s. 885.03 except that substituted personal service may be made only as provided in s. 801.11(1)(b)
and except that officers, directors, and managing agents of
public or private corporations subpoenaed in their official
capacity may be served as provided in s. 801.11(5)(a).
The general subpoena rules in Chapter 885 govern appearance of witnesses before county boards, coroners, et al., as well
as the appearance of witnesses in civil actions. Rather than to
tamper with the general rules, the Judicial Council Civil Rules
Committee chose simply to supplement them with special provision for civil actions.
Subsection (1) permits attorneys of record to issue subpoenas. The act of obtaining subpoenas from a court clerk or
court commissioner is purely ministerial; there is no judicial or
quasi-judicial discretion involved in the issuance of a subpoena. Hence the new rule by-passes the middleman who
serves no judicial or administrative function and allows the
attorney-or an officer of the court-to issue his own subpoenas.
Subsection (2) is derived from Federal Rule 45(b). It provides protection to the witness who is served with an oppressive
subpoena duces tecum or who would incur substantial expense
in complying with a subpoena duces tecum. Subsection (2) also
broadens the scope of subpoenas duces tecum from "papers
and documents," under section 885.02(2), to "books, papers,
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documents and tangible things."'
The provision for protective orders in subsection (3) is new
and complements the provisions of section 804.01(3), regarding
protective orders for requests for the production of documents
and tangible things under section 804.09.
The form of the subpoena set out in subsection (4) is intended to: (1) impress upon the person on whom the subpoena
is served that there is statutory authority for compelling his
appearance; (2) give the witness notice that a failure to obey
may result in punishment; and (3) provide the witness with
enough information about the attorney who caused him to be
served that he can readily contact him by telephone or mail if
he has any questions.
Subsection (5) is designed to correct the constitutional inadequacy of the provision for service of subpoenas under the
former practice. Section 885.03, which has not been repealed
by the adoption of these rules, permits a subpoena to be served
simply by leaving a copy at the witness's abode. By permitting
other than personal service without first requiring that due
diligence be used to attempt to serve the witness personally,
section 885.03 fails to satisfy the due process requirements for
service of process set out by the United States Supreme Court
in Mullane v. Hanover Trust Co.4" Subsection (5) attempts to
correct this defect by cross-reference to sections 801.11(1)(b)
and (5)(a) and makes the service provisions respecting subpoenas similar, although by no means identical, to the service
provisions respecting summonses. In fact, the rules for the service of subpoenas are less constitutionally vulnerable than the
rules for service of summonses, since service by publication or
mailing, which is an authorized mode of service of a summons
under section 801.11, is not an authorized mode of service of a
subpoena under either this section or section 885.03.

805.08 Jurors.

(1)

QUALIFICATIONS, EXAMINATION.

The court shall examine on oath each person who is called
as a juror to discover whether he is related by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney appearing in the case,
or has any financial interest in the case, or has expressed or
41. The phrase "books, papers and tangible things" makes the subpoena duces
tecum provision consistent with section 804.09, governing requests to produce documents and tangible things. For a discussion of the subpoena duces tecum during
discovery proceedings, see commentary on Wis. STAT. § 804.09, Graczyk, The New
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure:Chapter804, 59 MARQ. L. REV. at 510-512 (1976).
42. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the
case. If a juror is not indifferent in the case, he shall be
excused. Any party objecting for cause to a juror may introduce evidence in support of the objection. This section shall
not be construed as abridging in any manner the right of
either party to supplement the court's examination of any
person as to his qualifications, but such examination shall
not be repetitious or based upon hypothetical questions.

(2)

ALTERNATE JURORS.

If the court is of the opinion that

the trial of the action is likely to be protracted, it may call
an alternate juror or jurors. They shall be drawn in the same
manner and have the same qualifications as regular jurors
and shall be subject to like examination and challenge. The
alternate jurors shall take the oath or affirmation and shall
be seated next to the regular jurors and shall attend the trial
at all times. If the regular jurors are kept in custody, the
alternates shall also be so kept. If before the final submission
of the cause a regular juror dies or is discharged, the court
shall order an alternate juror to take his place in the jury box.
If there are two or more alternate jurors, the court shall select
one by lot. Upon entering the jury box, the alternate juror
becomes a regular juror.
(3) NUMBER OF JURORS DRAWN; PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
A sufficient number of jurors shall be called in the action so
that twelve shall remain after the exercise of all peremptory
challenges to which the parties are entitled as hereinafter
provided. Each party shall be entitled to three such challenges which shall be exercised alternately, the plaintiff beginning; and when any party declines to challenge in his turn,
such challenge shall be made by the clerk by lot. The parties
to the action shall be deemed two, all plaintiffs being one
party and all defendants being the other party, except that
in case where two or more defendants have adverse interests,
the court, if satisfied that the due protection of their interests
so requires, in its discretion, may allow peremptory challenges to the defendant or defendants on each side of said
adverse interests, not to exceed three. Each side shall be
entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those
otherwise allowed by law if alternate jurors are to be impaneled.
(4) JURY VIEW. On motion of any party, the jury may be
taken to view any property, matter or thing relating to the
controversy between the parties when it appears to the court
that the view is necessary to a just decision. The moving
party shall pay the expenses of the view. The expenses shall
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afterwards be taxed like other legal costs if the party who
incurred them prevails in the action.
Subsection (1) replaces former section 270.16, which permitted the trial court to conduct voir dire examinations upon
the request of either party. The new rule now makes it mandatory that voir dire examination be conducted by the court,
supplemented by additional questions posed by counsel in appropriate cases. This practice has been recommended by the
Wisconsin court:
We approve the procedure followed by the trial court in
conducting the voir dire examination. This procedure is for
the court to propound the questions quite generally asked of
jurors in most jury trials. Under this procedure, counsel are
confined to later propounding only those questions to individual jurors which cover matters not included in the questions
put by the court. We deem that this greatly shortens the time
required in picking a jury over that required where the court
leaves the questioning entirely to counsel, but at the same
time adequately protects the interests of the parties. We especially commend the step here followed of holding a preliminary conference between the court and counsel, without the
hearing of the jury, for the purpose of permitting counsel to
request that particular questions be propounded to the jury
and permitting opposing counsel to enter objections thereto.
If any requested questions are denied, or if objections are
entered to questions the court proposes to ask the panel, the
reporter should record the same as was done here.43
Subsection (1) adds to the disqualifying conditions enumerated in former section 270.16 relationship by blood or marriage
to any attorney appearing in the case. The rule does not purport to define what degree of relationship will disqualify a juror
for cause.44
Because voir dire examination is generally time-consuming
and easily exploited by counsel for purposes beyond the establishment of an impartial jury, many courts restrict the scope
of the voir dire examination conducted by the court or by counsel. 5 The last sentence of subsection (1) is designed to make
'43.
44.
cousin
(1932)
45.

Filipak v. Plombon, 15 Wis. 2d 484, 496, 113 N.W.2d 365 (1962).
See Kelso v. Kuehl, 116 Wis. 495, 93 N.W. 455 (1903) (juror married to first
of one of defendant's attorneys); Maaks v. Schultz, 207 Wis. 624, 242 N.W. 195
(juror's sister married cousin of plaintiff's wife).
Utz, Advantages and Disadvantagesof Having Voir Dire Examinations of Pro-
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explicit that in Wisconsin counsel's right to examine prospective jurors is to be restricted only by a prohibition against
repetitious and hypothetical questions.
This subsection permits the court to examine prospective
jurors specifically to establish grounds for challenges for cause,
both principle cause and cause to the favor.4 6 In addition, the
Wisconsin court has held that statutory grounds for challenges
for cause are not exclusive,47 and that the trial court is vested
with wide discretion in the conduct of voir dire examination
and in excusing jurors on its own motion."
Notwithstanding the reaffirmation of counsel's right to conduct voir dire examination represented by the last sentence of
subsection (1), the precise scope of the examination permitted
counsel remains unclear. Under subsection (1) the role of counsel is limited to supplementing the trial court's examination of
the jurors' "qualifications." This language raises the question
of whether counsel may properly inquire beyond matters
strictly relating to cause. It is well-recognized that voir dire
examination by counsel is aimed not simply at eliminating
partial jurors from the panel, but also at establishing rapport
with the jurors who are actually chosen and even at "conditioning" them toward a favorable view of the case. 9 Subsection (1)
simply leaves to the trial court's discretion the determination
of how closely counsel's questions may relate to the disqualifications enumerated in the rule.
The prohibition against hypothetical questions will undoubtedly reduce the use of voir dire for purposes other than
the establishment of cause. As one commentator has pointed
out, jury "conditioning" is most successfully accomplished by
the use of questions which assume either evidentiary or ultimate facts which the opposition will prove. These questions are
now prohibited by the rule."0
spective Jurors Conducted by the Court, 38 INS. COUNS. J. 450 (1971).
46. The common law distinction between challenges for principal cause (for example, interest in the outcome or relationship to a party), where partiality is conclusively
presumed, and challenges for cause to the favor, where circumstances such as friendship created a suspicion of partiality, has been revived by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Nolan v. Venus Ford, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974).
47. Id. at 221, 218 N.W.2d at 510.
48. Kanzenback v. S.C. Johnson and Sons, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 79 N.W. 2d 249
(1957).
49. Hermann, Conditioning the Jury to Secure a FavorableResult, 10 DEFENSE L.
J. 13 (1961).
50. Examples of hypothetical questions which "condition" the jury are:
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It should be pointed out that subsection (1) neither authorizes nor prohibits the use of written questionnaires submitted
to prospective jurors and completed prior to the commencement of their term as jurors. The use of juror data sheets .has
proven to be an effective substitute for extensive voir dire examination in jurisdictions which have restricted the scope of
voir dire examination.5 1 Since these data sheets can be used to
ascertain the answers to almost all the questions which are
asked during the examination, this practice can practically
eliminate the expenditure of time required for voir dire examination without sacrificing its essential purposes. The author
recommends the use of juror data sheets in state practice.
Subsection (2) is identical to the alternate juror rule in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 972.05, except that the
court is not restricted to a maximum of two alternate jurors. It
would, of course, be an extraordinary case where more than two
alternate jurors are impanelled.
Subsection (3) is identical to former section 270.18 except
for the addition of the last sentence. The former statutes contained no special provisions governing the number of
additional peremptory challenges the court may allow when
alternate jurors are called. By leaving the language of former
section 270.18 unchanged, the new rule does nothing to resolve
the considerable uncertainty under the former practice concerning the circumstances under which defendants may be accorded additional peremptory challenges and how many the
court has discretion to accord.
In a suit where no cross complaints have been filed, subsecIf the plaintiff does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was negligent, will you bring in a verdict for the defendant? If
he does prove that the defendant was negligent but does not prove that it was
the proximate cause of the injuries claimed by the plaintiff, will you bring in a
verdict for the defendant?
If the plaintiff proves negligence on the part of the defendant and that it was
the proximate cause of the injuries of which he complains but if the evidence
shows that the plaintiff's own conduct contributed to cause the injuries complained of, will you, as required under the law, bring in a verdict for the defendant? Will this be so, as also required by the law, even if you find that the
plaintiff's negligence contributed only in the slightest degree? Will your verdict
be likewise, as required under the law, if you find that both the defendant and
the plaintiff were negligent, but the defendant was more negligent than the
plaintiff?.
10 DEFENSE L.J. at 20-21.
51. Utz, supra note 44, at 450.
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tion (3) unambiguously provides that all plaintiffs and all defendants respectively constitute two "sides" to be accorded
three peremptory challenges each. But where defendants have
adverse interests, the court has discretion to award additional
challenges to any of the defendants. The rule does not define
adversity, nor has the court recently construed the term. The
early case of Hundhausen v. Atkins, suggests only that adversity requires "substantially distinct defenses" and exists
"where the interests of the defendants are separate, so as necessarily to require proceedings by each, to some extent on his own
behalf.""2
Where one defendant cross claims for damages against another defendant, adversity unquestionably exists. But it is less
clear whether the requirement of "adversity" is satisfied where
one defendant cross claims for contribution against another.
Since a cross claim for contribution is conditional upon the
plaintiff's original claim, and since at the time it is made it
cannot stand as an independent cause of action, it may not
constitute a sufficiently "separate and distinct defense" re3
quired for adversity under this rule.1
Even where cross claims are clearly adverse, it is unfortunate that the rule makes no provision for considering the amount
of the cross claims in relation to the size of plaintiff's claim
when the court determines adversity. For example, in a personal injury action where one defendant cross claims against
another for property damage, the amount of which is insubstantial in relation to the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries,
the rules permit the court to award additional challenges to the
defendants without also permitting the court to award additional challenges to the plaintiff. Yet it can be argued that the
distribution of peremptory challenges should not depend
merely upon which party initiated the action, but should also
have some relation to the parties' actual stake in the suit.
Subsection (3) is ambiguous not only as to when additional
challenges are appropriate, but also as to how many challenges
52. 36 Wis. 518, 521 (1875).
53. This view of whether cross claimants for contribution are adverse is perhaps
overly cautious, since most jurisdictions which have addressed the question have held
that cross claims for contribution do create adversity of interest for purposes of awarding peremptory challenges. 32 A.L.R.2d 747. The actual practice in Milwaukee County
is generally to grant additional peremptory challenges where cross claims for contribution have been made.
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the court has discretion to award. The wording of the rule
simply does not make clear whether each individual adverse
defendant can be awarded no more than three peremptory
challenges apiece or whether once adversity among defendants
is found, three is the maximum number of additional challenges which may be distributed in the court's discretion to the
defendants taken as a whole, over the basic six. It should also
be emphasized that subsection (3) permits the court to award
additional challenges only to "defendants." Although cross
claims between plaintiffs are infrequent, section 802.07(2) does
not preclude them. Yet cross claiming plaintiffs taken together
are still entitled only to three challenges, unless the court determines that a plaintiff who is crossclaimed against becomes
a "defendant" for the purpose of receiving additional peremptory challenges.
Subsection (4) is identical to former section 270.20.
805.09 Juries of fewer than 12; five-sixths
verdict. (1) JURY. The parties may stipulate that the jury
shall consist of any number less than 12.
(2) VERDICT. A verdict agreed to by five-sixths of the
jurors shall be the verdict of the jury. If more than one question must be answered to arrive at a verdict on the same
claim, the same five-sixths of the jurors must agree on all the
questions.
Subsection (1), derived from Federal Rule 48, will not
change state practice. The five-sixths verdict is mandated by
the Wisconsin Constitution. 4 Subsection (2) is virtually identical to former section 270.25(1) and codifies the long established
state rule that when a special verdict is used, the same fivesixths of the jurors must agree on all of the special verdict
questions "essential to support the judgment entered upon
55
it,"

including the comparison of negligence questions in a

personal injury action. 6 The effect of the five-sixths rule in a
personal injury action has been described as disqualifying a
juror who dissents from a finding of negligence or causation
from answering the comparison of negligence question. 57 The
54. WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 5.

55. Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 190, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948).
56. Fleischacker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 215, 79 N.W.2d 817
(1956).
57. Id. at 220, 79 N.W.2d at 820.
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sole exception to the requirement of unanimity of five-sixths of
the panel is the rather ingenious "only more so" rule. When a
juror's dissent to an answer to a special verdict question can
be reasonably interpreted to mean only that the dissenting
juror sought a verdict even more favorable to the winning side
than the one actually handed down, the Wisconsin court has
held that the juror's dissent is properly disregarded." If, for
example, a juror who finds no causal negligence as to the plaintiff dissents to a finding of ninety-five per cent causal negligence as to the defendant, the trial court should disregard that
dissent, since the juror's dissent actually supports the verdict
''only more so."
The problem of frequent defective verdicts due to violations
of the five-sixths verdict rule, necessitating numerous new
trials, was particularly acute when the "long-form" special verdict was standard state practice. That special verdict form was
mandated by the court in Gherke v. Cochran, which held that
in personal injury actions a special verdict must inquire into
each ground of negligence put in issue by the evidence.5 9 This
problem has been alleviated somewhat by the 1961 amendment
to section 805.12(1) (former section 270.27) authorizing the use
of a special verdict (in negligence cases) containing only questions of ultimate fact. However, defective verdicts based on
violations of the five-sixths rule still constitute a frequent
ground for the granting of a new trial, unless the defect is cured
either by the trial court's determination as a matter of law of
the answer to the question causing the defect'" or by a withdrawal of the claim to which the question causing the defect is
addressed."
805.10 Examination of witnesses; arguments. Unless the judge otherwise orders, not more than one attorney
for each side shall examine or cross-examine a witness and
not more than two attorneys on each side shall sum up to the
jury. The plaintiff shall be entitled to the opening and final
rebuttal arguments. Plaintiff's rebuttal shall be limited to

58. See Vogt v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 35 Wis. 2d 716, 151 N.W.2d 713
(1967); Lorbeck v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 463, 182 N.W.2d 1.6 (1971).
59. 198 Wis. 34, 222 N.W. 304 (1929); but see Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis. 2d 593,
146 N.W.2d 433 (1966).
60. Wendel v. Little, 15 Wis. 2d 52, 112 N.W.2d 172 (1961).
61. Krueger v. Winter, 37 Wis. 2d 204, 155 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
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matters raised by any adverse party in his argument. Waiver
of argument by either party shall not preclude the adverse
party from making any argument which he would otherwise
have been entitled to make. Before the argument is begun,
the court may limit the time for argument.
This section replaces former section 270.205. The new rule
substitutes the word "plaintiff" in the second and third sentences for the phrase "the party having the affirmative" in the
former statute in an attempt to express more accurately the
intendment of the former rule. Since in any action where a
counterclaim or an affirmative defense is pleaded, both parties
have "the affirmative," the former statute gave little practical
assistance in determining which side should open and close.
The new version accurately reflects the former practice by
making explicit that where the burden of persuasion at trial is
mixed, the plaintiff is entitled to open and close. 2 However, the
word "plaintiff" is not an accurate codification of the former
practice in all circumstances. For example, where the defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff and where no issue of
fact exists with respect to the plaintiff's claim, the court has
held that under former section 270.205, the defendant has the
only burden of persuasion and is therefore entitled to open and
close. 3 Yet, by its terms, the new rule gives the opportunity to
open and close to the plaintiff in all cases without regard to
whether he holds the burden of persuasion on any issue of fact
in the case.
805.11 Objections; exceptions. (1) Any party who
has fair opportunity to object before a ruling or order is made
must do so in order to avoid waiving error. An objection is not
necessary after a ruling or order is made.
(2) A party raising an objection must specify the
grounds on which he predicates his objection or claim of error.
(3) Exceptions shall never be made.
(4) Evidentiary objections are governed by s. 901.03.
This rule replaces former section 270.39, which provided
that exceptions are deemed made to all rulings and orders.
Subsection (3) eliminates the exception, which became an
empty formality with the appearance at trials of shorthand
62. Cunningham v. Gallagher, 61 Wis. 170, 20 N.W.925 (1884).
63. Bonnell v. Jacobs, 36 Wis. 59 (1874); Carmody v. Kolocheski, 181 Wis. 394, 194
N.W.584 (1923).
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reporters. The device has no place in the context of modern
litigation.
The first sentence of subsection (1) requires that every
party who has fair opportunity to object before a ruling is made
must do so in order to preserve his claim of error on appeal.
Once the objection appears on the record, the rule makes it
clear that the objecting party need not further object after the
ruling is made in order to have effectively preserved the claim
of error.
Subsection (1) is somewhat less clear as to whether an
objection after a ruling is necessary in order to preserve a claim
of error when the objecting party does not have a fair opportunity to object prior to the ruling, for example, when the court
rules sua sponte. The ambiguity lies in whether the two sentences of subsection (1) should be read conjunctively or as two
independent provisions. If the second sentence, like the first,
must be read to apply only where a fair opportunity to object
prior to the ruling is shown on the record, then where no fair
opportunity to object is shown an objection after a ruling is still
required by this rule. In effect, this interpretation of subsection
(1) would preserve the need for making exceptions in rare circumstances where no fair opportunity to object prior to a ruling
is shown, despite the elimination of the use of exceptions in
subsection (3).
However, if the second sentence is to be read independently, as is more likely, in view of subsection (3), then the
second sentence makes objections after a ruling permissive
rather than mandatory in all circumstances. Under this interpretation, a party who has no fair chance to object before the
court rules may, but need not, object thereafter in order to
preserve a claim of error. The rule thus recognizes that although it is wise to object to a ruling which so substantially
affects the rights of the parties as to be grounds for a reversal
of the judgment, in some circumstances it may be impractical
or impolitic to do so. Under this interpretation, the rule makes
the decision to object once a ruling has been made purely a
matter of trial strategy. However, since the rule is susceptible
to conflicting interpretations, counsel who is not afforded a fair
opportunity to object prior to a ruling should object afterwards
as a matter of cautious practice.
Making a proper objection in accordance with subsections
(1), (2) and (4) is not the only requirement for preserving error.
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The objecting party must avoid a waiver by conduct inconsistent with his objection,6 4 must move for a new trial after verdict
(but not after findings in a trial to the court according to section 805.17(2)),5 and must take the appropriate steps on .appeal to protect his claim of error.
Under subsection (4), evidentiary objections are also governed by the more specific provisions of section 901.03 of the
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, requiring that an objection or
motion to strike niust be timely and must include the specific
ground of the objection. Under section 901.03 (1), error may not
be predicated on an evidentiary ruling unless it affects the
substantial rights of the parties.6 None of the provisions of
section 901.03 are inconsistent with the provisions of section
805.11.
805.12 Special verdicts. (1) USE. Unless it orders
otherwise, the court shall direct the jury to return a special
verdict. The verdict shall be prepared by the court in the
form of written questions relating only to material issues of
ultimate fact and admitting a direct answer. The jury shall
answer in writing. In cases founded upon negligence, the
court need not submit separately any particular respect in
which the party was allegedly negligent. The court may also
direct the jury to find upon particular questions of fact.
(2) OMITTED ISSUE. When some material issue of ultimate
fact not brought to the attention of the trial court but essential to sustain the judgment is omitted from the verdict, the
issue shall be deemed determined by the court in conformity
with its judgment and the failure to request a finding by the
jury on the issue shall be deemed a waiver of jury trial on that
issue.
(3) CLERK'S ENTRIES AFTER VERDICT. Upon receiving a verdict, the clerk shall make an entry on his minutes specifying
the time the verdict was received and the court's order setting
time for motions after verdict under s. 805.16. The verdict
and special findings shall be filed.
Subsection (1) is based on a recognition that in Wisconsin
the special verdict is the rule and not the exception. 7 A party
64. See J. CONWAY, supra note 9, § 74.06.
65. Wells v. Dairyland Mutual Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 506, 80 N.W.2d 380 (1957).
66. Wis. STAT. § 901.03(1) is a specific application of the harmles error doctrine.
See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 805.18, infra at 715-16.
67. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) which states: "The court may require a jury to
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contending that a general verdict is more appropriate to the
case should be required to make an appropriate motion, unless
the court orders such verdict on its own motion. By eliminating
the requirement of former section 270.27 that a special verdict
must be requested by either party before any testimony is introduced in his behalf in order to avoid waiver of error if the
issues are submitted on general verdict, the new rule removes
a formality which had become nothing more than a trap for the
unwary.
Subsection (2) is substantially equivalent to former section
270.28 and is designed to insure that all issues essential to
sustain a judgment are merged in the judgment even though
they were not included in the special verdict findings. Therefore, this subsection does not apply to the situation where an
essential issue omitted from the special verdict form is called
to the attention of the trial court after submission to the jury
but before judgment. Where counsel has failed to request a
special verdict question on the omitted issue or has failed to
object to its exclusion at the post-evidence conference, a waiver
of a trial by jury on that issue occurs. 8 However, where a question is inadvertently omitted from the special verdict, the court
should either (1) send the jury back for further deliberations if
the omission is discovered before the jury is discharged," (2)
make findings of fact on the omitted issue, or (3) declare a
mistrial.
Subsection (3) replaces former section 270.31, which required the clerk to make a number of unnecessary entries in his
minutes. Former section 270.31 also directed the clerk to enter
judgment in accordance with the verdict unless the court otherwise ordered. In this respect, the statute was similar to Federal
Rule 58. However, clerks do not as a matter of course enter
judgment upon rendition of verdicts and it is not desirable that
they do so.7 0 Under these rules, entry of judgment does not
occur until after motions after verdict have been decided, and
under section 805.16 motions after verdict, including the winreturn only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue
of fact." (Emphasis added).
68. See commentary on Wis. STAT. § 805.13(3), infra at 699-702.
69. See, e.g., Cheatham Elec. Switching Device Co. v. Transit Devel. Co., 203 Fed.
289 (E.D. N.Y. 1913).
70. J. CONWAY, supra note 9, § 56.05.
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ner's motion for judgment on the verdict, cannot be heard until
at least ten days after rendition of the verdict.
805.13 Jury instructions; form of verdict. (1) STATEMENTS BY JUDGE. After the trial jury is sworn, all statements
or comments by the judge to the jury or in their presence
relating to the case shall be on the record.
(2) PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS. The judge may give preliminary instructions to the jury which instructions may
again be given in the charge at the close of the evidence.
(3) INSTRUCTION AND vEWRDIcT CONFERENCE. At the close of
the evidence and before arguments to the jury, the court shall
conduct a conference with counsel outside the presence of the
jury. At the conference, or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, counsel may file written motions that the
court instruct the jury on the law, and submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. The court shall inform
counsel on the record of its proposed action on the motions
and of the instructions and verdict it proposes to submit.
Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or verdict on
the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating the
grounds for his objection with particularity on the record.
Failure to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of any
error in the proposed instructions or verdict.
(4) INSTRUCTION. The court shall instruct the jury before
or after closing arguments of counsel. Failure to object to a
material variance or omission between the instructions given
and the instructions proposed shall not constitute a waiver of
error.
(5) REINSTRUCTION. After the jury retires, the court may

reinstruct the jury as to all or any part of the instructions
previously given, or may give supplementary instructions as
it deems appropriate.
Subsection (1) is the equivalent of former section 270.21. As
long as the phrase "to the jury or in their presence" is construed

to encompass only those statements made within the jury's
hearing, the status of the "bench conference," conventionally
regarded as an off-the-record proceeding, will remain unchanged.
Subsection (2) is the equivalent of former section 270.19.
The "preliminary instructions" authorized by this rule may be
given prior to the submission of any evidence, since generally
they do not intrude on the merits of the case. 7' The word
71. Id., § 46.01.
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"charge" as used here is a carryover from the former statute
and refers to the instructions actually given by the judge under
subsection (4).
Subsection (3) authorizes the trial judge to set a time for
written motions requesting jury instructions and submitting
proposed special verdict questions. The time set may be at
either a post-evidence conference, which this rule institutes,72
or an earlier point in the proceeding, as long as the court's order
is reasonable. Since it is impossible to determine finally what
instructions will be appropriate except in light of an evidentiary record and similarly, since it is impossible to determine
the precise composition of a special verdict form except in light
of expert testimony generally presented at the close of trial, it
is doubtful whether the court may "reasonably" require submission of the instructions or special verdict form prior to any
evidence or perhaps even prior to the close of plaintiff's case.
Subsection (3) requires the court to inform counsel of the
proposed instructions and special verdict questions, although
the rule does not state when this notification must be made or
whether the court must inform counsel of the precise language
which the court will use. Presumably, notification of counsel
may occur prior to the post-evidence conference.
The new rule permits counsel to object to the instructions
proposed by the judge on the grounds of "completeness or other
error," thereby eliminating the distinction between instructions which have material omissions and instructions which
inaccurately state the law. Under the former practice, where an
instruction given was incomplete, counsel had a duty to object
at the time the instruction was given or else waive his claim of
error, whereas if the instruction given erroneously stated the
law, counsel was not required to object, but simply had to move
for a new trial on that ground. 3 Under subsection (3) counsel
must object to an instruction which he considers to be inadequate on any ground.
Subsection (3) provides that a waiver of error occurs if counsel fails to object at the post-evidence conference, but does not
address the question of what the effect is of a failure by counsel
72. The use of a conference in which counsel participate in the formulation of
instructions and special verdict questions was recommended in Bohlman v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 61 Wis. 2d 718, 214 N.W.2d 52 (1974).
73. Savina v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 36 Wis. 2d 694, 154 N.W.2d 237 (1967).
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to request a specific instruction either at the conference or at
an earlier date set by the court. Under the former rule, where
the trial court failed to give an instruction, counsel could not
claim error on that ground if he failed to request the instruction. 74 But under subsection (3) requests by counsel are permissive. By the terms of the rules, a party has preserved his claim
of error based on either erroneous or incomplete instructions as
long as he objects no later than at the post-evidence conference
to the instructions which the judge proposes to serve whether
or not he has requested an instruction in the first instance.7
By permitting counsel to withhold objections to an instruction which the judge proposes to give without a waiver until the
post-evidence conference, subsection (3) is inconsistent with
the provisions of section 805.11(1), governing objections and
rulings. Under section 805.11(1) any party who is given fair
opportunity to object to a ruling must do so promptly in order
to preserve a waiver of his claim of error. Under this subsection,
although counsel may have been informed of the proposed instructions and special verdict questions before the postevidence conference, it appears that he has not waived his
objections until that point.
Subsection (4) restates the provisions of former section
270.21 making jury instructions given by the court mandatory.
The new rule premits these instructions to be given before or
after "closing arguments." The phrase "closing arguments"
apparently refers here not just to the plaintiff's closing rebuttal
but to all of counsels' oral arguments as authorized by section
805.10. The last sentence of this subsection states that once an
objection has been made to the "instructions proposed," i.e.,
the proposed instructions decided upon by the trial court, no
later than the post-evidence conference, an objection to the
instructions actually given is not necessary to preserve error for
review. This provision is consistent with the treatment of objections to rulings in general under section 805.11(1).
Subsection (5) simplifies the language of former section
270.23, permitting reinstructions, but does not clarify whether
an objection to the reinstructions or supplemental instructions
74. Withers v. Tucker, 28 Wis. 2d 82, 135 N.W.2d 77 (1965).
75. Under the former practice an objection to an incomplete instruction had to be
made at least prior to the return of the verdict. Menge v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.,
41 Wis. 2d 578, 164 N.W.2d 495 (1969).
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must be made in order to preserve a claim of error on that
ground and what procedure should be followed. For example,
it is unclear whether the last sentence of subsection (4), dispensing with the need to object to instructions actually given,
applies as well to reinstructions or supplemental instructions.
805.14 Motions challenging sufficiency of evidence;
motions after verdict. (1) TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE. No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer
in a verdict, shall be granted unless the court is satisfied that,
considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to
sustain a finding in favor of such party.
(2)

NONSUIT ABOLISHED;

MISDESIGNATION

OF

MOTIONS.

(a) The involuntary fionsuit is abolished. If a motion for
involuntary nonsuit is made, it shall be treated as a motion
to dismiss.
(b) When a party mistakenly designates a motion to dismiss as a motion for directed verdict, or vice versa; or mistakenly designates a motion to change answer as a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or vice versa; or otherwise mistakenly designates a motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of law, the court shall treat the
motion as if there had been a proper designation.
(3)

MOTION AT CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.

At the close

of plaintiff's evidence, any defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. If the court determines that the defendant is entitled to dismissal, the court
shall state with particularity on the record or in'its order of
dismissal the grounds upon which the dismissal was granted
and shall render judgment against the plaintiff.
(4) MOTION AT CLOSE OF ALL EVIDENCE. In trials to the
jury, at the close of all evidence, any party may challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law by moving for
directed verdict or dismissal or by moving the court to find
as a matter of law upon any claim or defense or upon any
element or ground thereof.
(5) MOTIONS AFTER VERDICT. (a) Motion for judgment.
Any party who would recover a favorable judgment if judg-

ment were entered on the verdict may move the court for
judgment on the verdict.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. A
party against whom a verdict has been rendered may move
the court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the
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event that the verdict is proper but, for reasons evident in the
record which bear upon matters not included in the verdict,
the movant should have judgment.
(c) Motion to change answer. Any party may move the
court to change an answer in the verdict on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the answer.
(d) Motion for directed verdict. A party who has made
a motion for directed verdict or dismissal on which the court
has not ruled pending return of the verdict may renew his
motion after verdict. In the event the motion is granted, the
court may enter judgment in accordance with the motion.
(e) Preliminary motions. It is not necessary to move for
a directed verdict or dismissal prior to submission of the case
to the jury in order to move subsequently for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or to change answer.
(6) GROUNDS TO BE STATED WITH PARTICULARITY. In any
motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the grounds
of the motion shall be stated with particularity. Mere conclusory statements and statements lacking express reference to
the specific element of claim or defense as to which the evidence is claimed to be deficient shall be deemed insufficient
to entitle the movant to the order sought. If the court grants
a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court shall state on the record or in writing with particularity
the evidentiary defect underlying the order.
(7) EFFECT OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies for good cause recited
in the order, any dismissal under this section operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
(8) NONWAIVER. A party who moves for dismissal or for
a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an
opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is
not granted without having reserved the right to do so and to
the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have
moved for directed verdict.
(9)

INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM

OR THIRD-PARTY CLAIM. This section applies to counterclaims,
cross claims and third-party claims.
This section is designed to bring together under one heading
the most basic rules governing motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Subsection (1)" restates the test for sufficiency that is used on all motions challenging the sufficiency
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of evidence in jury trials. 6
Subsection (2)(a) abolishes the involuntary nonsuit of former section 270.24. Since the motion for a nonsuit, which has
been called a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence,77 is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss, there is no need for a
special designation for such a motion made at the close of a
plaintiff's case in chief. Subsection (2)(b) is designed to insure
that misdesignation of a motion challenging sufficiency of the
evidence will not, by itself, render the motion ineffective. If the
relief sought by the movant and the grounds of this motion are
clear, the court should disregard the misdesignation and proceed as if the motion had been properly designated.
The motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case under
subsection (3) differs from the motion for involuntary nonsuit
in several respects. Under former section 270.24 the order
granting a nonsuit did not operate on the merits and plaintiff
could commence another suit on the same cause. However, the
motion to dismiss under this rule operates on the merits, according to subsection (7), unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise. Sufficient cause may exist where the dismissal of an
apparently meritorious claim is sought on procedural grounds
or on grounds which would have justified a motion for voluntary nonsuit under the former rules-for example, where an
important witness does not appear after reasonable efforts by
the party moved against to obtain his presence.
The motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiffs evidence has
no exact counterpart in the Federal Rules. Federal Rule 41(b)
76. See Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W.407 (1923);
Kingston v. McGrath, 232 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1956); Wisconsin Home Savings Bank v.
Gertenback, 270 Wis. 386, 71 N.W.2d 347 (1955). See also J. CONWAY, supra note 9, §
48.10. In the version of subsection (1) originally proposed by the Judicial Council Civil
Rules Committee this standard for ruling upon motions challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence was applied to motions challenging "a finding of fact in a case tried
without a jury." ProposedRules of Civil Procedure, 47 Wis. BAR BULL., SuPP. at 62
(1974). That phrase was deleted from the final version of subsection (1) in order to
preserve a distinction between the appropriate standard to be applied in jury and in
nonjury trials. See commentary on section 805.14(3), infra at .704. However, the Committee did not add a provision similar to subsection (1) stating expressly the standard
to be applied to a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a trial to the
court. The presence of an express formulation of the standard applied in jury trials and
the absence of a similar formulation of the standard to apply in trials to the court have
led to some confusion as to whether section 805.14 retains the distinction at all. See
Household Utilities, Inc. v. Andrews Co., 71 Wis. 2d 17, 28, 236 N.W.2d 663, 668-669
(1976).
77. Styczinski v. Styczinski, 36 Wis. 2d 36, 40, 152 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1967).
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authorizes an analogous motion to dismiss after plaintiff has
presented his evidence in nonjury cases, and Federal Rule 50(a)
authorizes a motion for directed verdict in jury cases. The
grounds upon which these two motions are granted are different. On a motion for directed verdict, the judge rules on the
minimal sufficiency of the evidence, whereas on a motion to
dismiss in a nonjury case the judge, who is the trier of fact, may
actually weigh the evidence and make his findings of fact at the
time. 78 In state practice, these two motions aredenominated by
the same name, a motion to dismiss, and are set out in the
same rule. It should be pointed out, however, that the difference in the standard to be applied in granting the motion,
depending upon whether the trial is to a jury or the court, is
retained under these rules. "
Under subsection (4), any party may seek, not only a directed verdict or a dismissal, but also a partial directed verdict.
The motion for partial directed verdict is the analogue of the
motion for partial summary judgment under subsection
802.08(1) and the motion to change answer under subsection
(5) (a) of this section. It is functionally equivalent to the former
practice of objecting to the giving of an instruction on a certain
issue or of having the court answer a question in a special
verdict as a matter of law.
Subsection (4), read in conjunction with subsection (8), also
eliminates a peculiarity of the former practice whereby if both
parties moved without reservation for a directed verdict, a joinder in demurrer was produced and the issues were removed
from jury consideration." Under the new rule, if both parties
seek a directed verdict and both motions are denied, the case
is still decided by verdict.
Subsection (5) (a) does not change state practice by providing that in a jury case any party who seeks judgment in his
favor, may so move the court. 1 The use of a motion for judg78. See generally 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2371.
79. The Wisconsin court's recognition that different standards apply to a motion
to dismiss, depending upon whether the trial is to the court or before a jury was cast
in some doubt by the case of Newton v. Newton, 33 Wis. 2d 182,147 N.W.2d 328 (1967).
However, the existence of two distinct standards has been reaffirmed in Household
Utilities, Inc. v. Andrews Co., 71 Wis. 2d 17, 236 N.W.2d 663 (1976), a case which
specifically construes new section 805.14(3).
80. Wis. STAT. § 270.13 (1973).
81. J. CONWAY, supra note 9, § 55.01.
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ment is advisable, since occasionally the winner on the verdict
may settle the claim and will not seek a judgment. The trial
court should therefore await the motion.
Under the former practice a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict could be used to challenge either a general
82
or a special verdict (without having the answers changed).
This practice is abolished by subsection (5)(b), which restricts
the use of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
to cases in which the verdict is proper but, for reasons evident
in the record which bear upon matters not included in the
verdict (for example, the running of the statute of limitations
on plaintiff's claim), the movant should have judgment. When,
after a special verdict is returned, a party wishes to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the answers in the
verdict, the proper procedure is to interpose a motion to change
answers under subsection (5)(c) or to renew his motion for directed verdict under subsection (5)(d).83
By giving the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict a particularized use, the rule leaves unanswered the question of what motion is now appropriate to challenge the sufficiency of a general verdict, especially if a motion for directed
verdict was not previously interposed. Clearly, the only alternative for challenging the sufficiency of a general verdict is the
motion to change answer under subsection (5)(c). In practice,
a motion identified by either name is permissible for this purpose, since subsection (2)(b) provides that a misdesignated
motion shall be treated as if properly designated by the court.
Subsection (5)(c) preserves the motion to change an answer
to a special verdict. This motion has added importance under
the new rules, since the use of the special verdict is made the
exception rather than the rule under section 804.12. The special
verdict does not have a similar importance in the federal
system; hence, it is not surprising that the motion to change a
special verdict answer has no counterpart in the Federal
Rules. 4
The Wisconsin court has recommended that a trial court
82. Id. at § 55.06.
83. See Senft v. Ed. Schuster & Co., 250 Wis. 406, 27 N.W.2d 464 (1947). See also
J. CONWAY, supra note 9, § 55.06.
84. In federal practice the appropriate motion for challenging an answer to a special
verdict is the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, preceded by a motion
for directed verdict under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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reserve its ruling on a motion for directed verdict until after the
jury has returned its verdict in order to eliminate the necessity
of granting a new trial.8 5 Accordingly, subsection (5)(d) expressly provides for a renewal of the motion after verdict.
Subsection (5)(e) abolishes the necessity of preliminary
motions as prerequisites for the making of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or to change answer. Although the former state practice did not make a motion for
directed verdict a prerequisite to making a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Federal Rule 50(b) does
contain that requirement. 6 The state rule recognizes that the
practice of taking pre-submission motions under advisement
pending the return of the verdict is so common in modern
litigation that the preliminary motions frequently serve no purpose other than laying the formal basis for the motions to be
made after verdict.
Motions challenging the sufficiency of evidence call for
analysis of the evidence. Under subsection (6), the movant is
required to bring to the attention of the court the specific defect
of which he complains. Generally, these rules make no provision for what happens when a party specifies an improper
ground for objection even though a proper one appears to be
present. In its discretion the court may relieve counsel of his
error by permitting an amendment of the motion to conform
to the record.
Subsection (7) is added to insure that dismissals granted on
the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence operate on the
merits, unless the court for good cause shown orders otherwise.
This section should be read in connection with the abolition of
the motion for involuntary nonsuit under subsection (2).
Subsection (8) abolishes the modern vestiges of the common law joinder in demurrer, which had the effect of withdrawing the case from the jury by implied waiver. Former section
270.26 had the same effect. This section, like Federal Rule
50(a), abolishes the waiver rule.
Subsection (9) applies the provisions for involuntary dismissal under this section to all claims in an action. It is analo85. Davis v. Shille, 12 Wis. 2d 482, 107 N.W.2d 458 (1961). see also J. CONWAY,
supra note 9, § 55.04.
86. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Red Man, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); See
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gous to subsection 805.04(4), which applies the provisions for
voluntary dismissal to all claimants in an action.
805.15 New trials. (1) MOTION. A party may move to
set aside a verdict and for a new trial because of errors in the
trial, or because the verdict is contrary to law or to the weight
of evidence, or because of excessive or inadequate damages,
or because of newly discovered evidence, or in the interest of
justice. Orders granting a new trial on grounds other than in
the interest of justice, need not include a finding that granting a new trial is also in the interest of justice.
(2) ORDER. Every order granting a new trial shall specify
the grounds therefor. No order granting a new trial shall be
valid or effective unless the reasons that prompted the court
to make such order are set forth on the record, or in the order,
or in a written decision. In such order, the court may grant,
deny or defer the awarding of costs.
(3)

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

A new trial shall be or-

dered on the grounds of newly discovered evidence if the court
finds that:
(a) The evidence has come to the moving party's notice
after trial; and
(b) The moving party's failure to discover the evidence
earlier did not arise from lack of diligence in seeking to discover it; and
(c) The evidence is material and not cumulative; and
(d) The new evidence would probably change the result.
(4) ALTERNATE MOTION; CONDITIONAL ORDER. If the court
grants a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
a motion to change answer and render judgment in accordance with the answer so changed, or a renewed motion for
directed verdict, the court shall also rule on the motion for
new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for
new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally
granted and the judgment has been reversed on appeal, the
new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court shall have
otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been
conditionally denied, the appellee may assert error in that
denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent
proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(5) APPEAL. If the court denies a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion to change answer
and render judgment in accordance with the answer so
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changed, or a renewed motion for directed verdict, the party
who prevailed on that motion may, as appellee, assert for the
first time, grounds which entitle him to a new trial in the
event the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred
in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or motion to change answer and render judgment in accordance with the answer so changed, or a renewed motion
for directed verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this section precludes it from determining
that the appellee is entitled to a new trial, or from directing
the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be
granted.

(6)

REMITTITUR; ADDITUR.

If a trial court determines

that a verdict is excessive or inadequate, not due to perversity
or prejudice or as a result of error during trial (other than an
error as to damages), the court shall determine the amount
which as a matter of law is reasonable, and shall order a new
trial on the issue of damages, unless within 10 days the party
to whom the option is offered elects to accept judgment in the
changed amount. If the option is not accepted, the order for
new trial shall be deemed final for purposes of appeal on the
last day of the option period.
The first sentence of subsection (1) restates almost verbatim the grounds on which a motion for a new trial could be
granted under former section 270.49. The Judicial Council
Civil Rules Committee refined the language of the former rule
by substituting the phrase "the weight of evidence" for the
word "evidence," to emphasize that the grounds for a new trial
are not the same as those for either judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or an order to change answers in a special verdict.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated:
It is well-settled that a trial court has the power to grant a
new trial in the interest of justice because the verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence [Citations omitted].
This is true even though it cannot be held as a matter of law
that a crucial answer to a question of the verdict is wrong in
the sense that it is not supported by any credible evidenceY
By providing that grounds other than "the interest of justice," standing alone, are sufficient to justify an order for a new
trial, the last sentence of this subsection reverses the rule of
87. Brunke v. Popp, 21 Wis. 2d 458, 462, 124 N.W.2d 642, 644 (1963).
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Guptill v. Roemer.88 Under former section 270.49(2), an order
for a new trial had to specify with particularity the reasons why
it was granted only when it was granted "in the interest of
justice." In Guptill the court required all orders for a new trial
to be granted "in the interest of justice," thereby insuring that
the reasons for the trial court's decision to grant a new trial
would be specified in every case in the event of an appeal.
Because subsection (2), which is based on former section
270.49, makes invalid any order for a new trial which fails to
specify the reasons which prompted the court to grant it, the
rule of Guptill has become superfluous.
Former section 270.50 authorized an order for a new trial
based on newly-discovered evidence. Subsection (3) replaces
this statute and adds an enumeration of the circumstances
which the Wisconsin court has held to be necessary for the trial
court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence."0
Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c) and especially subsection (3)(d) are
the most difficult elements of the rule to apply. Subsection 3(d)
is a specific application of the harmless error doctrine of section
805.18. It is fair to say that a finding by the trial court that the
new evidence would "probably change the result" requires an
appraisal by the trial court of the weight of the newly discovered evidence as well as the excusability of the failure to discover it earlier. Typically, a movant will be able to satisfy these
requirements only in a case which the trial court regards as
close. For example, the number of dissents to the verdict may
be a significant consideration in the trial court's determination
that a particular piece of newly discovered evidence will "probably" change the result.
Subsection (4) is derived from Federal Rule 50(c), providing
for alternative motions to set aside the verdict (or an answer
to a special verdict) and render judgment for the movant or for
a new trial. The trial court must rule on both branches of the
alternative motion.9" A federal commentator has emphasized
the flexibility and the potential savings in time offered by this
provision:
88. 269 Wis. 12, 68 N.W.2d 329 (1953).
89. See Dunlavy v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 105, 124 N.W.2d 73 (1963);
Erichson v. Clifton, 265 Wis. 236, 239, 61 N.W.2d 329 (1953).
90. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
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If the court grants judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
fails to act on the alternative motion for a new trial, litigation
will be needlessly protracted should the appellate court find
that the grant of judgment was erroneous. In that case it must
remand so that the trial court can rule on the new trial motion.9

Subsection (5), taken from Federal Rule 50(c), serves a
function similar to subsection (4), where the motion for ju.dgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied. It allows the winner on the verdict to assert grounds entitling him to a new trial,
in the event that the appellate court concludes that the trial
court erred in denying the loser's motion.
Subsection (6) codifies the long established state practice of
granting additur and remittitur options. If the trial court determines that the damages awarded by the jury are excessive, it
may give the plaintiff the option of accepting judgment for a
reduced sum which the court determines to be reasonable in
lieu of a new trial on the issue of damages. If the court determines that the damages awarded by the jury are inadequate,
the defendant is the party who is given the option. He may
accept a judgment against him increased by the amount determined reasonable by the trial court in lieu of a new trial. The
use of additur and remittitur options became considerably
more common after the case of Powers v. Allstate Inc. Co.,
where the court held that in tort actions for unliquidated damages the trial court could set aside the damage award as excessive or inadequate without a finding that the excessive or inadequate verdict was due to perversity, prejudice or error during
the course of the trial." Although additur options are less common than remittitur options,93 Wisconsin, unlike the federal
courts, does not reject additur as a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. 4 The party to whom the option is
given has a standard time limit of ten days within which additur and remittitur options must be accepted in order to avoid
a new trial.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
(1962).

9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 2539 at 610.
10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
5 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN PLEADING AND PRAcrIcE § 36.25.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
Compare Lucas v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 568, 117 N.W.2d 660
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805.16 Time for motions after verdict. Upon rendition of verdict, the judge shall in open court set dates for
serving and filing motions and briefs and for arguing motions.
No notice of motion need be served for motions after verdict.
The dates for hearing arguments on motions shall be not less
than 10 nor more than 60 days after verdict. If an order granting or denying a motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence or for a new trial is not entered within 90 days after
verdict, the motion shall be deemed denied. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made at any time within one year after
verdict. Unless an order granting or denying the motion is
entered within 30 days after hearing, the motion shall be
deemed denied.
This section, which is designed to facilitate the final disposition of cases, makes a number of significant changes in the
former practice. For example, prior to the adoption of these
rules motions after verdict could be heard immediately after
the rendition of the verdict." Now, at least ten days must separate the rendition of the verdict from arguments on motions
after verdict. Ten days will allow time for the preparation and
filing of briefs by counsel and independent research by the trial
judge without unduly delaying the final dispostion of the case.
This minimal waiting period for the hearing of motions after
verdict is consistent with the Wisconsin court's recognition
that the public interest is best served by procedural devices
which afford the trial court an opportunity to correct its own
errors without the necessity of appeal. 7
Under former subsection 270.49(1), a motion for new trial
made on any grounds other than newly-discovered evidence
had to be made and heard within two months of the verdict.
This two-month limitation period was judicially applied to
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict," but not to
motions to change an answer to a special verdict. 9 The new
rule applies the same deadline for hearings on all motions after
verdict except the motion for a new trial based on newlydiscovered evidence which can be made within a year of the
verdict or finding, as was the case under former section 270.50.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Wis. STAT. § 270.31 (1973).
Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 505, 516, 80 N.W.2d 380, 386 (1957).
Volland v. McGee, 236 Wis. 358, 294 N.W.497 (1941).
Webster v. Krembs, 230 Wis. 252, 282 N.W. 564 (1939).
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The provisions that any motion challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence which has not been ruled upon by the trial court
within ninety days of the rendition of the verdict is deemed
denied is a new provision designed to limit the time within
which motions may be made, heard and decided. However, it
accomplishes its time-saving purpose in a manner which disadvantages the moving party. The trial court's ruling on a motion
after verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence enjoys
a strong presumption of validity on appeal based on the trial
court's superior vantage point in ruling upon the sufficiency of
the evidence.' 0 But where a motion challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence is denied simply because the trial court never
acted on the motion one way or the other, this presumption will
work against the movant even though the ninety-day delay
which resulted in the denial was not his fault.
805.17 Trial to the court. (1) EFFECT. In all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the ultimate facts and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon. The court shall file its findings
and conclusions prior to rendering judgment. In granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly file
its written findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a referee may be
adopted in whole or part as the findings of the court. If an
opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law
appear therein. If the court directs a party to submit proposed findings and conclusions, the party shall serve the proposed findings and conclusions on all other parties not later
than the time of submission to the court. The findings and
conclusions or memorandum of decision shall be made as
soon as practicable and in no event more than 60 days after
the cause has been submitted in final form.
(2) AMENDMENT. Upon motion of a party made not later
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend
its findings or make additional findings and may amend the
100. Hein v. Huber, 214 Wis. 230, 252 N.W. 692 (1934); Bolsson v. Heenan, 3 Wis.
2d 110, 88 N.W.2d 32 (1958).
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judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial.
(3) APPEAL. In actions tried by the court without a jury,
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings may be raised on appeal whether or not the party
raising the question has objected in the trial court to such
findings or moved for new trial.
This rule is adapted from Federal Rule 52 and replaces
former section 270.33. The language of the federal rule has been
adjusted to reflect state practice. For example, the first sentence of the state rule authorizes the court to find "ultimate
facts," rather than to find the "facts specially," as does the
federal version. Just as in a trial to a jury, where the verdict
must be framed in terms of material issues of ultimate fact
under subsection 805.12(1), in a trial to the court the findings
should be similarly framed in terms of ultimate fact.
The last sentence of subsection (1) has also been added to
the federal model. It requires that findings and conclusions
shall be made as soon as practicable and in no event more than
sixty days after close of evidence. There is no way to enforce
this requirement other than perhaps by extraordinary writ (an
unlikely procedure by one seeking favorable findings and conclusions). However, the intendment and purpose of the rule is
clear-to have cases tried to the court disposed of with some
dispatch after close of evidence.
Subsection (2), providing for amendments to the court's
findings, is adapted from Federal Rule 52(b) and will not
change former practice. 10
Subsection (3) is new. Since judges are able to deliberate,
with the aid of briefs prepared by counsel, before making findings, the findings should reflect the considered judgment of the
court. That is to say, findings, unlike many rulings during trial,
are not "shoot from the hip" affairs.' Thus, in trials to the
court, motions for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence are relatively inappropriate. Since such motions become
mere formalities, they are not required under the new rules.
The proper procedure is to object to proposed findings and
101. Costello v. Grant County Mut. Fire & Life Ins. Co., 133 Wis. 361, 113 N.W.
639 (1907).
102. Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 505, 516, 80 N.W.2d 380, 386
(1957).
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conclusions before they are entered. Thereafter, the question is
one either of appeal or of relief from judgment under section
806.06.
805.18 Mistakes and omissions; harmless error.
(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard
any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall
not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the ground of
drawing, selection or misdirection of jury, or the improper
admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which
the application is made, after an examination of the entire
action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a
new trial.
This section codifies the harmless error doctrine.' 3 Subsection (1) is identical to former section 269.43 which sets out the
harmless error doctrine as it is applied by the trial court.
Subsection (2) replaces former section 270.52, governing irregularities in the impaneling of the jury, with a statutory description of the harmless error doctrine as it is to be applied by the
appellate court. By making explicit that the determination of
whether the error complained of affects the substantial rights
of the party is left to "the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding," this section attempts to embody the test for determining prejudicial error used by the Wisconsin court:
We have previously stated that errors in the conduct of the
trial will not justify a reversal of the judgment "unless it
appears pretty clearly that had they not occurred, the result
might probably have been more favorable to the party
complaining." 0 4

The test of what constitutes error affecting the substantial
rights of the parties is essentially the same whether applied by

103. Another statutory description of the harmless error doctrine as it should be
applied by the trial court is found in section 805.15(3)(d), governing the grounds on
which the trial court may grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
104. Fischer v. Fischer, 31 Wis. 2d 293, 307, 142 N.W.2d 857, 866 (1966).
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the trial or appellate court. It requires a finding that to some
degree of probability, not merely possibility, the error complained of has changed the outcome of the case."'5 Unquestionably, an important factor in determining whether error is harmless is the strength of the case in support of the verdict. The
same error may be harmless in a case where the evidence is one
sided, but may be prejudicial in a close case.
CHAPTER

806

JUDGMENT

806.01 Judgment. (1)(a) A judgment is the determination of the action. It may be final or interlocutory.
(b) Each judgment shall specify the relief granted or
other determination of the action, and the name and place of
residence of each party to the action and his occupation,
trade or profession.
(c) Every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. If there
be no answer the relief granted to the plaintiff shall not exceed that demanded in his complaint.
(2) If a partial judgment is proper in an action with several parties, the court in its discretion, may render judgment
against one or more of the defendants and dismiss or permit
the action to proceed against the others. In case of a finding
substantially disposing of a claim on its merits, but leaving
an account to be taken or a condition to be performed in order
fully to determine the rights of the parties, an interlocutory
judgment may be rendered disposing of all issues covered by
the finding and reserving final judgment.
This rule makes few changes in the former practice. Subsection (1) (a) expressly provides that judgments are either final or
interlocutory. Former section 270.53(1) defined all judgments
as "final determinations." Since interlocutory judgments are
by common acceptance not final determinations, the former
definition was misleading.
These rules do not replace the definition of an order in
former section 270.53(2), and leave unclear precisely which
judicial or administrative proceedings result in determinations
which are "judgments" within the meaning of subsection (1).
The changes made in former section 270.71(1) by subsection
105. Menge v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 578, 164 N.W.2d 495 (1969).
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(1) (b) are designed to increase the ease with which a judgment
can be executed by explicitly providing that the name as well
as the place, abode and occupation of the parties be listed and
by affirmatively requiring that all of the information contained
in the judgment be as clear and as accurate as possible. The
version of this subsection originally proposed by the Judicial
Council Committee on Civil Rules, requiring the judgment to
specify the Social Security number of each party was deleted
prior to adoption.' 6
Subsection (1)(e) makes one significant change in the former practice. Under former section 270.57, where defendant
had answered, the court could grant the plaintiff any relief
"consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the same," thus limiting the relief to the scope
of the pleadings. But under this subsection if defendant has
answered, the court may grant any relief to which a claimant
is "entitled," even if not demanded by his pleading.
Subsection (2) supersedes former section 270.54. The first
sentence of the former rule is replaced in simplified form by the
first sentence of the new rule. The second sentence of the former rule is replaced by section 805.03, and the last sentence of
the former rule has been adopted practically verbatim in the
last sentence of the new rule. The only change is to omit cases
in which "any issue of fact" has not been decided from the list
of cases in which an interlocutory judgment can be made.
806.02 Default judgment. (1) A default judgment
may be rendered as provided in subs. (1) to (4) if no issue of
law or fact has been joined and if the time for joining issue
has expired. Any defendant appearing in an action shall be
entitled to notice of motion for judgment.
(2) After filing the complaint and proof of service of the
summons on one or more of the defendants and an affidavit
that the defendant is in default for failure to join issue, the
plaintiff may move for judgment according to the demand of
the complaint. If proof of any fact is necessary for the court
to give judgment, the court shall hear the proof.
(3) If a defendant fails to appear in an action within the
time fixed in s. 801.09 the court shall, before entering a judgment against such defendant, require proof of service of the
106. 47 Wis.

BAR BULL., SUPP. 1

(1974).
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summons in the manner required by s. 801.10 and, in addition, shall require further proof as follows:
(a) Where a personal claim is made against the defendant, the court shall require proof by affidavit or other evidence, to be made and filed, of the existence of any fact not
shown by the complaint which is needed to establish grounds
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court may
require such additional proof as the interests of justice require.
(b) Where no personal claim is made against the defendant, the court shall require such proofs, by affidavit or otherwise, as are necessary to show the court's jurisdiction has
been invoked over the status, property or thing which is the
subject of the action. The court may require such additional
proof as the interests of justice require.
(4) In an action on express contract for recovery of a
liquidated amount of money only, the plaintiff may file with
the clerk the complaint, proof of personal service of the summons on one or more of the defendants and an affidavit that
the defendant is in default for failure to join issue. The clerk
shall enter judgment against the defendants who are in default for the amount demanded in the complaint. Leaving the
summons at the abode of a defendant is not personal service
within the meaning of this subsection.
(5) A default judgment may be rendered against any
defendant who has appeared in the action but who fails to
appear at trial. If proof of any fact is necessary for the court
to render judgment, the court shall hear the proof.
Subsection (1) provides that any defendant appearing in an
action shall be entitled to notice of motion for judgment. This
provision changes the rule under former section 270.62(3) that
a notice of application for judgment need not be given to a
defendant who has appeared in an action on a contract for a
liquidated sum of money only. Former section 269.47, which
imposed special requirements in cases where jurisdiction is
acquired by publication, and subsection 270.62(4), which rendered judgments obtained in such actions vulnerable for three
years after rendition are repealed. Special protection for this
class of defendants is unnecessary and places an undue burden
on claimants.
Subsection (2) is equivalent to former section 270.62(2) except that the need to file the summons is eliminated to accommodate the new mode of commencing an action under section
801.02. Although an explicit reference to the use of a referee or
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a jury in proving any fact is omitted from the new rule, no
change in the former practice is contemplated.
Subsection (3) is former section 262.18 renumbered.
Except for a change in language to accommodate the new
mode of commencing an action, as in subsection (2), subsection
(4) is essentially the same as former section 270.62(3).
Subsection (5) is new. It extends the provisions for a default
judgment to a party who has appeared in the action but who
has failed to appear for trial. When read with subsection (1),
subsection (5) provides that a defendant who has appeared in
the action but who has not appeared for trial is nevertheless
entitled to a notice of motion for judgment even though had he
appeared for trial and lost on the verdict, he would not have
been entitled to a notice of motion for judgment under section
805.16. It should be noted that subsection (5) does not specify
whether the rendition of default judgment against an absent
defendant is to be made pursuant to motion or on the court's
own motion.
Default judgment under subsection (5) is the plaintiff's
counterpart to the relief accorded a defendant under section
805.13, for failure of a claimant to prosecute his claim. In fact,
the two sections substantially overlap, since section 805.13 also
provides that severe sanctions may be imposed on "any party"
for failure to comply with procedural rules or to obey any order
of the court, including, of course, the scheduling order setting
the date for trial.
Former section 270.62(4), which contains special
requirements for obtaining a default judgment against a nonresident defendant served by publication, has been stricken.
806.03 Judgment on admitted claim; order to
satisfy. In an action on an express contract for the recovery
of a liquidated sum of money only, if the answer admits any
part of the plaintiffs claim or if the answer sets up a counterclaim for an amount less than the plaintiff's claim and contains no other defense to the action, the clerk, on motion of
the plaintiff, shall enter judgment for the amount so admitted or for the amount claimed in the complaint less the
amount of the defendant's counterclaim. When the defendant admits part of the plaintiffs claim to be just, the court,
on motion, may order the defendant to satisfy that part of the
claim and may enforce the order as it enforces a judgment or
provisional remedy.
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This section is former section 270.63 renumbered.
806.04

Declaratory judgments.

(1)

SCOPE. Courts of

record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such
declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
(2) POWER TO CONSTRUE, ETC. Any person interested
under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract
or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. No party
shall be denied the right to have declared the validity of any
statute or municipal ordinance by virtue of the fact that he
holds a license or permit under such statutes or ordinances.
(3) BEFORE BREACH. A contract may be construed either
before or after there has been a breach thereof.
(4) REPRESENTATIVES, ETC. Any person interested as or
through a personal representative, executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin or cestui que trust, in the administration
of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, mental
incompetent or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or
legal relations in respect thereto:
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or
(b) To direct the personal representatives, executors,
administrators or trustees to do or abstain from doing any
particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction
of wills and other writings.
(5) ENUMERATION NOT EXCLUSIVE. The enumeration in
subs. (2), (3) and (4) does not limit or restrict the exercise of
the general powers conferred in sub. (1) in any proceeding
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or
decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
(6) DISCRETIONARY. The court may refuse to render or
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enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment
or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
(7) REVIEW. All orders, judgments and decrees under this
section may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.

(8)

SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF.

Further relief based on a dec-

laratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable
notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show
cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
(9) JURY TRIAL. When a proceeding under this section
involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may
be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact
are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in
which the proceeding is pending.
(10) COSTS. In any proceeding under this section the
court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable
and just.
(11) PARTIES. When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the right of persons not parties to the
proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of
a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall
be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general shall also be served with a copy
of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.

(12)

CONSTRUCTION.

This section is declared to be reme-

dial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other
legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.

(13)

WORDS CONSTRUED.

The word "person" wherever

used in thie section, shall be construed to mean any person,
partnerehip, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.

(14)

PROVISIONS SEVERABLE.

The several sections and pro-

visions of this section except subs. (1) and (2) are declared
independent and severable, and the invalidity, if any, of any
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part or feature thereof shall not affect or render the remainder
of the statute invalid or inoperative.

(15)

UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION.

This section shall be

so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it,
and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and
regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.

(16)

SHORT TITLE.

This section may be cited as the "Uni-

form Declaratory Judgments Act."
This section is former section 269.56 renumbered.
806.05 Declaratory judgments against obscene
matter. (1) GROUNDS FOR AND COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.
Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that any book,
magazine, or other written matter, or picture, sound recording or film, which is being sold, loaned, or distributed in any
county, or is in the possession of any person who intends to
sell, loan or distribute the same in any county, is obscene, the
district attorney of such county, in the name of the state, as
plaintiff, may file a complaint in the circuit court for such
county directed against such matter by name. Upon the filing
of such complaint, the court shall make a summary examination of such matter. If it is of the opinion that there is reasonable cause to believe that such matter is obscene, it shall
issue an order, directed against said matter by name, to show
cause why said matter should not be judicially determined to
be obscene. This order shall be addressed to all persons interested in the publication, production, sale, loan, exhibition
and distribution thereof, and shall be returnable within 30
days. The order shall be published as a class two notice,
under ch. 985. A copy of such order shall be sent by certified
mail to the publisher, producer, and one or more distributors
of said matter, to the persons holding the copyrights, and to
the author, in case the names of any such persons appear on
such matter or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained
by said district attorney. Such publication shall commence
and such notices shall be so mailed within 72 hours of the
issuance of the order to show cause by the court.
(1m)

INTERLOCUTORY ADJUDICATION.

After the issuance of

the order to show cause under sub. (1), the court shall, on
motion of the district attorney, make an interlocutory finding
and adjudication that said book, magazine or other written
matter or picture, sound recording or film is obscene, which
finding and adjudication shall be of the same effect as the
final judgment provided in sub. (3) or (5), but only until such
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final judgment is made or until further order of the court.
(2) RIGHT TO DEFEND; JURY TIRAL. Any person interested
in the publication, production, sale, loan, exhibition or distribution of such matter may appear and file an answer on or
before the return day named in said notice. If in such answer
the right to trial by jury is claimed on the issue of the obscenity of said matter, such issue shall be tried to a jury. If no
right to such trial is thus claimed, it shall be deemed waived,
unless the court shall, for cause shown, on motion of an answering party, otherwise order.

(3)

DEFAULT.

If no person appears and answers within

the time allowed, the court may then, without notice, upon
motion of the plaintiff, if the court finds that the matter is
obscene, make an adjudication against the matter that the
same is obscene.
(4) SPEEDY HEARING; RULES OF EVIDENCE. If an answer is
filed, the case shall be set down for a speedy hearing, but an
adjudication of default and order shall first be entered
against all persons who have not appeared and answered in
the manner provided in sub. (3). If any person answering so
demands, the trial shall not be adjourned for a period of
longer than 72 hours beyond the opening of court on the day
following the filing of his answer. At such hearing, subject to
chs. 901 to 911, the court shall receive the testimony of experts and evidence as to the literary, cultural or educational
character of said matter and as to the manner and form of
its production, publication, advertisement, distribution and
exhibition. The dominant effect of the whole of such matter
shall be determinative of whether said matter is obscene.
(5) FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT. If, after such hearing, the
court, or jury (unless its finding is contrary to law or to the
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence), determines that such matter is obscene, the court shall enter judgment that such matter is obscene. If it is so determined that
such matter is not obscene, the court shall enter judgment
dismissing the complaint, and a total of not more than $100
in costs, in addition to taxable disbursements, may be
awarded to the persons defending such matter, which shall be
paid from the county treasury. Any judgment under this
subsection may be appealed to the supreme court pursuant
to ch. 817 by any person adversely affected, and who is either
interested in the publication, production, sale, loan, exhibition or distribution of said matter, or is the plaintiff district
attorney.
(6) ADMISSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. In any trial

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

for a violation of s. 944.21 or 944.22, the proceeding under this
section and the final judgment of the circuit court under sub.
(3) or (5) or the interlocutory adjudication under sub. (1m),
shall be admissible in evidence on the issue of the obscenity
of said matter and on the issue of the defendant's knowledge
that said matter is obscene, provided, that if the judgment
of the court sought to be introduced in evidence is one holding
the matter to be obscene, it shall not be admitted unless the
defendant in said criminal action was served with notice of
the judgment of the court hereunder, and the criminal prosecution is based upon conduct by said defendant occurring
more than 18 hours after such service or such appearance,
whichever is earlier.
This section is former section 269.565 renumbered.
806.06 Rendition,
perfection
and entry of
judgment. (1)(a) A judgment is rendered by the court
when it is signed by the judge or by the clerk at the judge's
written direction.
(b) A judgment is entered when it is filed in the office
of the clerk of court.
(c) A judgment is perfected by the taxation of costs and
the insertion of the amount thereof in the judgment.
(d) A judgment is granted when given orally in open
court on the record.
(2) The judge or the clerk upon the written order of the
judge may sign the judgment. The judgment shall be entered
by the clerk upon rendition.
(3) After an order or judgment is entered, either party
may serve upon the other a written notice of entry.
(4) A judgment may be rendered and entered at the instance of any party either before or after perfection. If the
party in whose favor the judgment is rendered causes it to be
entered, he shall perfect his judgment within 30 days of entry
or forfeit his right to recover costs. If the party against whom
the judgment is rendered causes it to be entered, the party
in whose favor the judgment is rendered shall perfect it
within 30 days of service of notice of entry of judgment or
forfeit his right to recover costs. If proceedings are stayed
under s. 806.08, judgment may be perfected at any time
within 30 days after the expiration of.the stay. If the parties
agree to settle all issues but fail to file a notice of dismissal,
the judge may direct the clerk to draft an order dismissing the
action. No execution shall issue until the judgment is perfected or until the expiration of the time for perfection, unless
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the party seeking execution shall file a written waiver of his
entitlement to costs.
The former statutes referred somwhat confusingly to judgment being "given," "awarded," "granted," or "rendered,"
without defining these terms. The definitions contained in
subsection (1), especially in subdivisions (1)(a) and (1)(d), are
designed to bring some precision to the terminology concerning
judgments.
However, the advantages gained by precise definitions are
diminished somewhat by the inconsistent use of these terms in
the renumbered statutes. For example, section 806.10(1) ties
the ten-year judgment lien to the entry of judgment, while
section 806.19(1) ties the five-year period for satisfaction of the
judgment to the date of rendition of the judgment. Section
806.14 permits the filing in other counties of a real estate judgment once it is "rendered." Since section 806.14 also requires
that all papers "filed" be transmitted along with the judgment,
the word "entered" rather than "rendered" would be more consistent with the definitions set out in this rule.
Subsection (2) replaces former section 270.65. It dispenses
with the unnecessary requirement of the former rule that the
clerk enter judgment only "upon the direction of the court,"
except where authorized to do so without the direction of the
court.
Subsection (3) is identical to former section 270.535, except
that the phrase "after an order or a judgment is entered" is
substituted for the phrase "after an order is entered or judgment is perfected" of the former statute to accommodate the
new provisions of subsection (4).
Subsection (4) makes considerable changes in the procedure for perfecting judgment. Under the former practice (section 270.66), the winner of a lawsuit first taxed costs, then
perfected his judgment and then caused it to be entered. Alternatively, when counsel prepared the judgment, he could leave
blank the amount of costs at the time the judgment was signed
and enter them after the clerk had taxed the amounts.107 If he
failed to follow either procedure, within sixty days of the filing
of a verdict or the order to enter judgment, the clerk of court
was to prepare and enter the proper judgment, but without
107. J. CONWAY, supra note 9, § 56.06.
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costs. The new rule makes clear that either party may cause
the judgment to be rendered and entered, and perfection may
occur after entry. Thus, the new rule should tend to shorten the
time within which appeals must be filed, since the period is
triggered by entry of judgment or notice of entry of judgment.' 8
The last sentence of the rule retains the provision of former
section 270.66 that no execution shall issue until perfection or
the time for perfection has expired.
806.07 Relief from judgment or order. (1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or
stipulation for the following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence which entitles a party to
a new trial under s. 805.15(3);
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged;
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated;
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more than one year
after the judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was
made. A motion based on sub. (1)(b) shall be made within
the time provided in s. 805.16. A motion under this section
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This section does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from judgment,
order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud on
the court.
This section is based on Federal Rule 60(b). The only substantial change made in the language of the federal rule is to
substitute the phrase "judgment, order or proceeding" of the
federal rule with the phrase "judgment, order or stipulation"
108. Wis.

STAT.

§ 274.01 (1973).
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taken from the former state rule.
This section attempts to achieve a finer balance between
the policy favoring the finality of judgments and the requirements of substantial justice than that represented by former
section 269.46. The new rule sets out a procedure to relieve
from judgment not only "a party," as in the former rule, but
also his legal representative. The former rule limited the number of circumstances under which a motion to vacate a judgment could be sought. The new rule considerably expands this
list, while subsection (1)(h) gives the court wide discretion to
entertain the motion for other justifiable reasons.
Under former section 269.46(1), the motion to vacate judgment could be brought within one year after judgment is entered. However, subsection (2) constricts this time period
somewhat by requiring the motion to be brought within "a
reasonable time" not to exceed one year after judgment was
entered.
Subsection (2) also adds an important reminder that orders
of relief from judgment do not reduce the court's power to
entertain an independent equitable action, for example, an action based on fraud, to relieve a party from judgment.
806.08 Stay of proceedings to enforce a
judgment. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, an
interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction
or in a receivership action shall not be stayed during the
period after its entry and until an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal. Subsection (3) governs the suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting of an injunction
during the pendency of an appeal.
(2) In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, tile court may stay the
execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial, or to alter or
amend a judgment, or of a motion for relief from a judgment
or order.
(3) When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or
final judgment or appealable order granting, dissolving or
denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise
as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the
adverse party.
(4) When an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain
a stay in accordance with ss. 817.14 to 817.30.
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(5) This section does not limit any power of an appellate
court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal or
to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or
the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered.
(6) When a court has rendered a final judgment under
the conditions stated in s. 806.01(2), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering of a subsequent
judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as
are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in
whose favor the judgment is entered.
This section is based on Federal Rule 62, except for subsection (4) which makes the provisions of chapter 817 (former
chapter 274 renumbered) control stays pending appeal. With
respect to execution of judgment, this section should be read
with section 806.06(4) which provides that no execution shall
issue until the judgment is perfected or until the expiration of
the time for perfection, unless the party seeking execution files
a written waiver of his entitlement to costs.
806.09 Restitution in case of reversed judgment;
purchaser for value. (1) If any judgment or part of a
judgment is collected and such judgment is afterwards set
aside or reversed, the trial court shall order the same to be
restored with interest from the time of the collection, but in
case a new trial is ordered the party who has collected the
judgment may retain the same pending the new trial, upon
giving a bond in such sum and with such sureties as the court
shall order, conditioned for the restoration of the amount
collected with interest from the time of collection. The order
of restitution may be obtained upon proof of the facts upon
notice and motion and may be enforced as a judgment. Nothing herein shall affect or impair the right or title of a purchaser for value in good faith without notice.
(2) Whenever in a civil action on appeal to the supreme
court the appellant fails to stay execution and pending the
appeal the sheriff or other officer collects all or any part of
the judgment appealed from, the officer collecting the same
shall deposit the amount collected, less his fees, with the
clerk of the court out of which execution issued. In case of
reversal on such appeal restitution may be made in accordance with sub. (1). In case of affirmance the clerk shall pay
over such deposit to the judgment creditor on the filing of the
remittitur from the -upreme court.
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This section is former sections 270.67 and 270.68 renumbered.
806.10 Judgment docket. (1) At the time of entry of
a judgment directing in whole or in part the payment ofmoney the clerk shall enter in a judgment docket, either arranged alphabetically or accompanied by an alphabetical
index, a docket of such judgment containing:
(a) The name at length of each judgment debtor, with
his place of residence and occupation, trade or profession. If
the judgment or judgment docket fails to give the place of
residence, the occupation, trade or profession of the judgment
debtor, the validity of the judgment shall not be affected
thereby but, the judgment creditor may at any time file with
the clerk an affidavit stating, on knowledge or information
and belief, such information; and the clerk shall thereupon
enter the facts according to the affidavit in the docket, noting
the date and hour of such entry.
(b) The name of the judgment creditor, in like manner.
(c) The name of the attorney for the judgment creditor,
if stated in the record.
(d) The date of the entry of the judgment.
(e) The day and hour of entering such docket.
(f) The amount of the debt, damages or other sum of
money recovered, with the costs.
(g) If the judgment is against several persons such statement shall be repeated under the name of each person against
whom the judgment was rendered, in the alphabetical order
of their names, respectively, when the docket is arranged
alphabetically, or entered in the index under the name of
each such person when the docket is kept with an alphabetical index accompanying.
(2) Whenever any docketed judgment shall be reversed
and the remittitur filed the clerk shall enter on the docket
"reversed on appeal."
(3) Every clerk who dockets a judgment or decree and
enters upon the docket a date or time other than that of its
actual entry or neglects to docket the same at the proper time
shall be liable in treble damages to the party injured.
This section is identical to former sections 270.74, 270.82
and 270.84, except that the words "or judgment docket" have
been added to the second sentence of subsection (1)(a).
The provision that the docket of judgment also contain the
social security number of the judgment debtor contained in the
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proposed draft of these Rules of Civil Procedure' 9 has been
deleted from the rules as promulgated by the court.
806.11 Delinquent income tax docket. At the time of
filing the warrant provided by s. 71.13(3) or 71.11(23), the
clerk shall enter in the delinquent income tax docket, either
arranged alphabetically or accompanied by an alphabetical
index, a docket of such warrant containing:
(1) The name at length of each delinquent income tax
debtor, with his place of residence and occupation, trade or
profession, if any such be stated in the warrant.
(2) The date of the warrant.
(3) The day and hour of entering such docket.
(4) The amount of delinquent income taxes with interest, penalties and costs as set forth in the warrant.
(5) If the warrant be against several persons such statement shall be repeated under the name of each person against
whom the warrant was issued, in the alphabetical order of
their names, respectively, when the docket is arranged alphabetically, or entered in the index under the name of each such
person when the docket is kept with an alphabetical index
accompanying.
This section is substantially identical to former section
270.745.
806.12 Transcript of municipal justice's judgment. The clerk of the circuit court shall, upon the production to him of a duly certified transcript of a judgment
for more than $10, exclusive of costs, rendered by any municipal justice in his county, forthwith file the same and docket
such judgment in the docket of the court in the manner
prescribed in s. 806.10. When the transcript shows that execution was stayed in the municipal court, with the name of
the surety thereof, the clerk shall docket the judgment
against such surety as well as the judgment debtor, and such
surety shall be bound thereby as a judgment debtor and his
property be subject to lien and be liable thereon to the same
extent as his principal. Every such judgment, from the time
of such filing of the transcript thereof, shall be deemed the
judgment of the circuit court, be equally under the control
thereof and be carried into execution, both as to the principal
judgment debtor and his surety, if any, in the same manner
and with like effect as the judgments thereof, except that no
109. 47 Wis. BAR BULL., SuPP. 1 (1974).
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action can be brought upon the same as a judgment of such
court nor execution issued thereon after the expiration of the
period of the lien thereof on real estate provided by s. 806.15.
This section is former section 270.75 renumbered.
806.13 Judgments, docketed in other counties. When
a judgment is docketed as provided in ss. 806.10, 806.12 and
806.24, or a warrant is docketed as provided in ss. 108.22(2)
and 806.11, it may be docketed in like manner in any other
county, upon filing with the clerk of court thereof a transcript
from the original docket, certified to be a true copy therefrom
by the clerk of the original court having custody thereof.
This section is former section 270.76 renumbered.
806.14 Enforcement of real estate judgment in other
counties. If a judgment affecting real property is rendered
in any county other than that in which such property is situated the trial court may, at any time, order that the judgment
with all papers filed and copies of entries, orders and minutes
made in the action, shall be by its clerk certified and transmitted to and filed by the clerk of the circuit court of the
county where such property is situated; or order that certified
copies thereof be so transmitted and filed and upon such
filing such judgment may be enforced in such circuit court,
with the same force and effect as if such judgment had been
originally entered therein. The trial court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce such judgment when certified copies of the papers are transmitted.
This section is former section 270.78 renumbered.
806.15 Lien of judgment; priority; statute may be
suspended. (1) Every judgment, when properly docketed,
and the docket gives the judgment debtor's place of abode
and his occupation, trade or profession shall, for 10 years
from the date of the entry thereof, be a lien on the real property (except the homestead mentioned in s. 815.20) in the
county where docketed, of every person against whom it is
rendered and docketed, which he has at the time of docketing
or which he acquires thereafter within said 10 years. A judgment based upon a claim discharged in bankruptcy shall
upon entry of the order of satisfaction cease to be and shall
not thereafter become a lien on any real property of the discharged person then owned or thereafter acquired.
(2) When the collection of the judgment or the sale of
the real estate upon which it is a lien shall be delayed by law,
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and the judgment creditor shall have caused to be entered on
the docket "enforcement suspended by injunction" or otherwise, as the case may be, and such entry dated, the time of
such delay after the date of such entry shall not be taken as
part of said 10 years. And whenever an appeal from any judgment shall be pending and the bond or deposit requisite to
stay execution has been given or made, the trial court may,
on motion, after notice to the judgment creditor, on such
terms as it shall see fit, direct the clerk to enter on the docket
that such judgment is "secured on appeal" and thereupon it
shall cease during the pendency of such appeal to be a lien.
(3) If the judgment is affirmed on appeal or the appeal
is dismissed the clerk shall, on the filing of the remittitur,
enter on the docket "lien restored by affirmance" or "lien
restored by dismissal of appeal" with the date of such entry,
and the lien thereof shall be thereupon restored. Similar entries may be made with the like effect upon the docket of such
judgment in any other county upon filing with the clerk of the
circuit court thereof a transcript of the original docket.
This section is former section 270.79 renumbered.
806.16 Supreme court judgment, docketing. The
clerk of the supreme court, on demand and upon payment of
one dollar, shall furnish a certified transcript of any money
judgment of said court which transcript may be filed and
docketed in the office of any clerk of the circuit court in the
manner that other judgments are docketed and shall then be
a like lien and for a like time as circuit court judgments on
the real property in the county where docketed. And whenever the supreme court shall remit its judgment for the recovery of money or for costs to the lower court such judgment
shall in like manner be docketed by the clerk of said court
and shall have the like force and effect as judgments of the
circuit court so docketed.
This section is former section 270.80 renumbered.
806.17 Docketing federal judgments. Every judgment and decree requiring the payment of money rendered in
a district court of the United States within this state shall be,
from the docketing thereof in said court, a lien upon the real
property of the judgment debtor situated in the county in
which it is so docketed, the same as a judgment of the state
court. A transcript of such docket may be filed with the clerk
of the court of any other county; and shall be docketed in his
office as in the case of judgments and decrees of the state
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courts and with like effect, on payment of fees as provided in
s. 59.42.
This section is former section 270.81 renumbered.
806.18 Assignment of judgment. (1) When a duly
acknowledged assignment of a judgment is filed with the
clerk he shall note the fact and the date thereof and of filing
on the docket.
(2) An assignment may be made by an entry on the
docket thus: "I assign this judgment to A.B.," signed by the
owner, with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk.
This section is former section 270.85 renumbered.
806.19 Satisfaction of judgments. (1)(a) A judgment may be satisfied in whole or in part or as to any judgment debtor by an instrument signed and acknowledged by
the owner or, at any time within five years after the rendition
thereof (when no assignment has been filed) by his attorney
of record, or by an acknowledgement of satisfaction, signed
and entered on the docket in the county where first docketed,
with the date of entry, and witnessed by the clerk. Every
satisfaction of a part of a judgment or as to some of the
judgment debtors shall state the amount paid thereon or for
the release of such debtors, naming them.
(b) No satisfaction by an attorney shall be conclusive
upon the judgment creditor in respect to any person who has
notice of revocation of the authority of such attorney, before
any payment made thereon or before any purchase of property bound by such judgment has been effected.
(c) On filing a duly executed satisfaction with the clerk
he shall enter the same on the court record of the case and
shall enter a statement of the substance thereof, including
the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket with
the date of filing the satisfaction.
(2) When an execution is returned satisfied in whole or
in part the judgment is deemed satisfied to the extent of the
amount so returned unless such return is vacated and the
clerk shall enter in the docket that the amount stated in such
return has been collected.
(3) For the purpose of paying any money judgment, the
debtor may deposit with the clerk of the court in which the
judgment was entered the amount of his liability thereon.
The clerk shall give the debtor a certifiate showing the date
and amount of the deposit and identifying the judgment; and
shall immediately note on the docket thereof and on the margin of the judgment journal the amount and date of the de-
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posit. The debtor shall immediately give written notice to the
owner of record of the judgment and to his attorney of record,
personally, or by registered mail, to his last known post-office
address, stating the amount, date and purpose of the deposit,
and that it is held subject to the order of such judgment
owner. Ten days after giving the notice, the clerk shall, upon
filing proof of such service, satisfy the judgment of record,
unless the trial court otherwise orders. Acceptance by such
owner of the sum deposited shall have the same legal consequences that payment direct by the debtor would have. Payment to the clerk shall include 50 cents clerk's fees.
(4) Upon proper notice, any person who has secured a
discharge in bankruptcy may apply to the court where any
judgment rendered void by such order of discharge was entered, for an order to satisfy such judgment. If the court finds
that such order of discharge in bankruptcy was duly obtained
and that its effect is to render void the judgment sought to
be satisfied, it shall declare such judgment to be satisfied and
direct satisfaction thereof to be entered on the docket. The
entry of such order of satisfaction of judgment shall bar any
other action in the courts of this state against such bankrupt
person based upon the judgment so satisfied.
This section is former sections 270.87, 270.88, 270.89,
270.86, 270.93 and 270.91(2) renumbered.
806.20 Court may direct satisfaction; refusal to
satisfy. (1) When a judgment has been fully paid but not
satisfied or the satisfaction has been lost, the trial court may
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to satisfy the
same or may by order declare the same satisfied and direct
satisfaction to be entered upon the docket.
(2) If any owner of any judgment, after full payment
thereof, fails for seven days after request and tender of his
reasonable charges therefor, to satisfy the judgment, he shall
be liable to the party paying the same, his heirs or representatives in the sum of $50 damages and also for actual damages
occasioned by such failure.
This section is former sections 270.90 and 270.94 renumbered.
806.21 Judgment satisfied not a lien; partial
satisfaction. If a judgment is satisfied in whole or in part
or as to any judgment debtor and such satisfaction docketed,
such judgment shall, to the extent of such satisfaction, cease
to be a lien; and any execution thereafter issued shall contain
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a direction to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect
only from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
This section is former section 270.91(1) renumbered.
806.22 Filing transcript of satisfaction. If a satisfaction of a judgment has been entered on the docket in the
county where it was first docketed, a certified transcript of
the docket or a certificate by the clerk, under his official seal,
showing the satisfaction, may be filed with the clerk of the
court in any county where it is docketed, and he shall thereupon make a similar entry on his docket.
This section is former section 270.92 renumbered.
806.23 Action on judgment, when brought. No action shall be brought upon a judgment rendered in any court
of this state between the same parties, without leave of the
court, for good cause shown, on notice to the adverse party.
This section is former section 270.95 renumbered.
806.24

act.

(1)

Uniform enforcement of foreign judgments
DEFINITION.

In this section "foreign judgment"

means any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United
States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state.

(2)

FILING AND STATUS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

A copy of

any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the
act of congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the
office of the clerk of circuit court of any county of this state.
The clerk shall treat any foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating
or staying as a judgment of a circuit court of this state and
may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

(3)

NOTICE OF FILING.

(a)

At the time of the filing of the

foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall
make and file with the clerk of court an affidavit setting forth
the name and last known post-office address of the judgment
debtor and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and
affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign
judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and
shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice
shall include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in
this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a
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notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor
and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing
notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement
proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has
been filed.
(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a
foreign judgment filed hereunder shall issue until 15 days
after the date the judgment is filed.
(4) STAY. (a) If the judgment debtor shows the court
that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will
be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the
court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the
appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay
of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of
the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the court any ground
upon which enforcement of a judgment of any court of this
state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the
foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring
the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is
required in this state.
(5) OPTIONAL PROCEDURE. The right of a judgment
creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of
proceeding under this section remains unimpaired.
(6) UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION. This section shall be
so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(7) SHORT TITLE. This act may be cited as the "Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act."
This section is former section 270.96 renumbered.
806.25 No judgment without action. Any authorization in a note executed after June 18, 1972, for the creditor,
or other person acting on his behalf, to confess judgment for
the debtor shall be void and unenforceable.
This section is former section 270.69 renumbered.
CHAPTER 807
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

807.01 Settlement offers. (1) After issue is joined
but at least 20 days before the trial, the defendant may serve
upon the plaintiff a written offer to allow judgment to be
taken against him for the sum, or property, or to the effect
therein specified, with costs. If the plaintiff accepts the offer
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and serves notice thereof in writing, before trial and within
10 days after receipt of the offer, he may file the offer, with
proof of service of the notice of acceptance, and the clerk
must thereupon enter judgment accordingly. If notice of acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given as evidence
nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer of judgment is not
accepted and the plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable
judgment, he shall not recover costs but defendant shall recover costs to be computed on the demand of the complaint.
(2) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before trial,
the defendant may serve upon the plaintiff a written offer
that if he fails in his defense the damages be assessed at a
specified sum. If the plaintiff accepts the offer and serves
notice thereof in writing before trial and within 10 days after
receipt of the offer and prevails upon the trial, either party
may file proof of service of the offer and acceptance and the
damages will be assessed accordingly. If notice of acceptance
is not given, the offer cannot be given as evidence nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer is not accepted and if damages
assessed in favor of the plaintiff do not exceed the damages
offered, neither party shall recover costs.
(3) After issue is joined but at least 20 days before trial,
the plaintiff may serve upon the defendant a written offer or
settlement for the sum,. or property, or to the effect therein
specified, with costs. If the defendant accepts the offer and
serves notice therof in writing, before trial and within 10 days
after receipt of the offer, he may file the offer, with proof of
service of the notice of acceptance, with the clerk of court. If
notice of acceptance is not given, the offer cannot be given
as evidence nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer of settlement is not accepted and the plaintiff recovers a more favorable judgment, he shall recover double the amount of the
taxable costs.
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) shall apply to offers which may
be made by any party to any other party who demands a
judgment or setoff against the offering party.
This section is former section 269.02 renumbered.
807.02 Motions, where heard; stay of proceedings. Motions in actions or proceedings in the circuit
court must be heard within the circuit where the action is
triable; in county courts, within their territorial jurisdiction.
Orders out of court, not requiring notice, may be made by the
presiding judge of the court in any part of the state. No order
to stay proceedings after a verdict, report or finding in any
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circuit court shall be made by a county judge or court commissioner, or in any county court by a court commissioner.
No stay of proceedings for more than 20 days shall be granted
except upon previous notice to the adverse party.
This section is generally equivalent to former section
269.27. However, former section 269.27 required motions in circuit court to be "made" within the circuit. Section 807.02 is
double-faceted: in conjunction with section 807.04 it defines
the place where hearings may be held and where orders may
be made. Former section 269.27 also prohibited ex parte stays
of proceedings for more than twenty days only if the stay was
ordered by a judge out of court, whereas this section makes the
prohibition apply even to a judge acting as the court. It should
be noted that like the former rules, these rules continue to
speak of making orders. But, although section 807.11 specifies
how an order is rendered and entered, these rules do not contain a definition of how orders are made.
Stays of proceeding to enforce judgments are governed by
section 806.08.
807.03 Orders, how vacated and modified. An order
made out of court without notice may be vacated or modified
without notice by the judge who made it. An order made upon
notice shall not be modified or vacated except by the court
upon notice, but the presiding judge may suspend the order,
in whole or in part, during the pendency of a motion to the
court to modify or vacate the order.
This section is former section 269.28 renumbered.
807.04 Proceedings, where held; restriction as to
making orders. All trials, and all hearings at which oral
testimony is to be presented, shall be held in open court. The
court may make any order which a judge or court commissioner has power to make. Court commissioners shall have
the powers provided in ch. 252 or by other statute.
807.05 Stipulations. No agreement, stipulation, or
consent between the parties or their attorneys, in respect to
the proceedings in an action or special proceeding shall be
binding unless made in court and entered in the minutes or
recorded by the reporter or made in writing and subscribed
by the party to be bound thereby or his attorney.
This section is based on subsection 269.46(2). The only
change in the former rule is the addition of the words "or recorded by the reporter." Requiring a minutes entry when an
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oral stipulation is recorded by the court reporter is duplicative
and has been held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to be
unnecessary.1 10 It should be emphasized that this statute in no
way diminishes counsel's ethical obligation to abide by all oral
and off-the-record stipulations."'
807.06 Copy of paper may be used, when. If any original paper or pleading be lost or withheld by any person the
court may authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used instead of the original.
This section is former section 269.49 renumbered.
807.07 Irregularities and lack of jurisdiction waived
on appeal; jurisdiction exercised; transfer to proper
court. (1) When an appeal from any court, tribunal, officer or board is attempted to any court and return is duly
made to such court, the respondent shall be deemed to have
waived all objections to the regularity or sufficiency of the
appeal or to the jurisdiction of the appellate court, unless he
moves to dismiss such appeal before taking or participating
in any other proceedings in said appellate court. If it appears
upon the hearing of such motion that such appeal was attempted in good faith the court may allow any defect or omission in the appeal papers to be supplied, either with or without terms, and with the same effect as if the appeal had been
originally properly taken.
(2) If the tribunal from which an appeal is taken had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the court to which the
appeal is taken has such jurisdiction, the court shall, if it
appears that the action or proceeding was commenced in the
good faith and belief that the first named tribunal possessed
jurisdiction, allow it to proceed as if originally commenced in
the proper court and shall allow the pleadings and proceedings to be amended accordingly; and in all cases in every
court where objection to its jurisdiction is sustained the cause
shall be certified to some court having jurisdiction, provided
it appears that the error arose from mistake.
This section is former section 269.51 renumbered.
807.08 Borrowing court files regulated. The clerk
shall not permit any paper filed in his office to be taken
therefrom unless upon written order of a judge of the court.
110. Czap v. Czap, 269 Wis. 557, 69 N.W.2d 488 (1955).
ill. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 1.
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The clerk shall take a written receipt for all papers so taken
and preserve the same until such papers are returned. Papers
so taken shall be returned at once upon request of the clerk
or presiding judge, and no paper shall be kept longer than 10
days.
This section is substantially identical to former section
269.60.
807.09 Conciliators. (1) A circuit judge of the circuit
court of any county may appoint and remove at any time, any
retired or former circuit or county court judge to act, in matters referred to him by the judge, in conciliation matters.
When a matter for conciliation is referred to him for such
purpose, the conciliator shall have full authority to hear, determine and report findings to the court. Such conciliators
may be appointed court commissioners as provided in s.
252.14(2).
(2) The circuit judges of such county shall make rules,
not inconsistent with law, governing procedure before and
pertaining to such conciliators and the county board shall fix
and provide for their compensation.
This section is substantially identical to former section
269.70. A reference to the use of conciliators in pretrial hearing
has been deleted as inconsistent with section 802.10, governing
pretrial conferences.
807.10 Settlements in behalf of minors; judgments.
(1) A compromise or settlement of an action or proceeding
to which a minor or mentally incompetent person is a party
may be made by his general guardian, if he is represented
by an attorney, or his guardian ad litem with the approval of
the court in which such action or proceeding is pending.
(2) A cause of action in favor of or against a minor or
mentally incompetent person may, without the commencement of an action thereon, be settled by his general guardian, if the guardian is represented by an attorney, with the
approval of the court appointing the general guardian, or by
his guardian ad litem with the approval of any court of record. An order approving a settlement or compromise under
this subsection and directing the consummation thereof
shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of the
court.
(3) If the amount awarded to a minor by judgment or by
an order of the court approving a compromise settlement of
a claim or cause of action of said minor does not exceed $1,500
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(exclusive of interest and costs and disbursements), and if
there is no general guardian of the ward, the court may upon
application by the guardian ad litem after judgment, or in the
order approving settlement, fix and allow the expenses of the
action, including attorney's fees and fees of guardian ad
litem, authorize the payment of the total recovery to the clerk
of the court, authorize and direct the guardian ad litem upon
said payment to satisfy and discharge the judgment, or to
execute releases to the parties entitled thereto and enter into
a stipulation dismissing the action upon its merits. The order
shall also direct the clerk upon such payment to him to pay
the costs and disbursements and expenses of the action and
to dispose of the balance in one of the manners provided in
s. 880.04(2) as selected by the court.
This section is former section 269.80 renumbered.
807.11 Orders; rendition and entry. (1) An order is
rendered when it is signed by the judge.
(2) An order is entered when it is filed in the office of the
clerk of court.
This section is new. It harmonizes the terminology concerning orders with the revised terminology concerning judgments
set out in section 806.06.
807.12 Suing by fictitious name or as unknown; partners' names unknown. (1) When the name or a part of
the name of any defendant, or when any proper party defendant to an action to establish or enforce, redeem from or
discharge a lien or claim to property is unknown to the plaintiff, such defendant may be designated a defendant by so
much of the name as is known, or by a fictitious name, or as
an unknown heir, representative, owner or person as the case
may require, adding such description as may reasonably indicate the person intended. But no person whose title to or
interest in land appears of record or who is in actual occupancy of land shall be proceeded against as an unknown
owner.
(2) When the name of such defendant is ascertained, the
process, pleadings and all proceedings may be amended by
an order directing the insertion of the true name instead of
the designation employed.
(3) In an action against a partnership, if the names of
the partners are unknown to the plaintiff, all proceedings
may be in the partnership name until the names of the partners are ascertained, whereupon the process, pleadings and
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all proceedings shall be amended by order directing the insertion of such names.
This section is former section 260.21 renumbered.

